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TENANTS' RIGHTS IN POLICE
POWER CONDEMNATIONS UNDER
STATE STATUTES AND
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Eric Wills Orts*
It is not every act, legislative in form, that is law. Law is
something more than mere will exerted as an act of power....
The enforcement of these limitations by judicial process ...
protect[s] the rights of individuals and minorities . . .against

the violence of public agents transcending the limits of lawful
authority, even when acting in the name and wielding the force
of government.1
Tenants faced with the condemnation of their buildings under
the police power have legal rights to enforce statutorily-mandated procedures in some states and, in the absence of such statutes, to invoke constitutional procedural due process rights to
notice and a hearing. Although full assertion of these rights
would not affect substantially the systemic problem of inadequate and unaffordable rental housing in the United States,2 it
* Associate, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. Articles Editor, 21 U. Mich.
J.L. Ref. (1988). B.A., Oberlin College, 1982; M.A., New School for Social Research, 1985;
J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1988.
I would like to thank Peter Iskin, Carolyn Carter, and the Legal Aid Society of Cleveland for providing the inspiration from which this Note grew. Thanks also to Peter Iskin
for reading a draft of this Note and suggesting improvements.
1. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-36 (1884) (Matthews, J.).
2. Rental housing shelters more than one-third of all households in the United States
and more than half of all households in central cities of metropolitan areas. OFFICE OF
POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HoUS. AND URBAN DEV., THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL URBAN POLICY REPORT

58 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 HUD

REPORT].

Almost ninety

percent of the nation's rental units are unsubsidized. Id. But over four million families
receive low-income housing assistance. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV.& RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF

DEV., THE PRESIDENT'S
[hereinafter 1986 HUD REPORT].
HOUs. AND URBAN

NATIONAL

URBAN POLICY REPORT

25 (1986)

A federal report admits that "[piroblems of housing affordability have escalated in
recent years, especially for low income households," but contends that "the overwhelming weight of available evidence indicates no current or long-run shortage of rental housing in the United States, although there may be shortages in particular rental markets."
The report attributes these shortages to "rent controls, high prices, or other marketdistorting mechanisms." 1984 HUD REPORT, supra, at 58 (citing Lowry, Rental Housing
in the 1970s: Searching for a Crisis, reprinted in J. WEICHER, K. VILLANI & E. RoIsTACHER, RENTAL HOUSING: Is THERE A CRISIS? (1981)).
Critics, on the other hand, maintain that "[tihe housing situation is not a crisis. It is a
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would ease the plight of at least some tenants threatened with
the loss of their homes through police power condemnations. 3
Situations requiring the assertion of these procedural rights
arise most often for the poor.4 This occurs for at least two reasons. First, the housing market allocates substandard, run-down
buildings, the usual targets of police power condemnations, 5 to
poorer tenants. Wealthier tenants can afford to live in nicer
buildings. Second, poor tenants cannot always depend upon the
owners of their buildings to challenge condemnations. Virtually
every state provides statutory rights to notice and a hearing for
owners faced with condemnation of their buildings under the police power.' But some owners may fail to contest condemnations
catastrophe." Brackley, The South Bronx: Past Destruction and the Rebuilding Process,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 3, 4 (1987). In the 1970s, rents increased almost twice as fast
as renters' incomes. Hayes, Litigating on Behalf of Shelter for the Poor, 22 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 79, 83 n.13 (1987) (citing K. HOPPER & J. HAMBERG, THE MAKING OF
AMERICA'S HOMELESS: FROM SKID ROW To NEW POOR, 1945-1984 30 (1984)). By 1983, over
three million low income households paid over half of their income for rent. 1986 HUD
REPORT, supra, at 26. Accord Study Warns of Inadequate Housing, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18,
1988, at 8, col. 1 (nat'l ed.) (paying thirty to fifty percent of income as rent "now common"). At the same time, a reduction in federal housing subsidies exacerbated rental
housing problems. Hayes, supra, at 83 n.16 (citing K. HOPPER & J. HAMBERG, supra, at
55) ("Cuts in publicly subsidized housing accounted for about one-half of the Reagan
Administration's domestic budget cuts in its first two years in office. . . .Publicly subsidized housing starts and renovations declined sharply during the Reagan era, from
200,000 in 1979 to 55,000 in 1983 and 30,000 in 1984."). Such trends led one recent study
to describe federal housing policy as "nothing short of tragic." R. HAYS, THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AND URBAN HOUSING 265 (1985).
3. Unambiguous national statistics tabulating the total annual number of police
power condemnations do not exist. A 1980 census found that demolition or disaster
claimed 1,808,000 housing units between October 1973 and October 1980. Unfortunately,
the figures do not break down the categories "demolition" and "disaster." A further
582,000 units "became vacant and were scheduled for demolition, condemned, severely
damaged by disaster, or were no longer protected from the elements." BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF HOUSING, vol. 4, pt. 1, at xvi (1983).
Again, the respective categories are not differentiated. Another source estimates that
demolition, abandonment, arson, and conversion claim more than 500,000 low-rent units
each year. Hayes, supra note 2, at 83 n.14 (citing K. HOPPER & J. HAMBERG, supra note 2,
at 32).
4. Federal "Section 8" housing legislation, following land use law in general, defines
the "poor" as including "households earning eighty percent or less of the median income
in the area in which they live." Mallach, The Fallacy of Laissez-Faire:Land Use Deregulation, Housing Affordability, and the Poor, 30 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 35, 51 &
n.52 (1986) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) (Supp. III 1985) and Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 221 n.8, 456 A.2d 390, 421-22
n.8 (1983)).
5. "Substandard" or "run-down" characterize some of the criteria under various state
statutes for exercising the police power to condemn buildings. See infra note 73 and
accompanying text.
6. State statutes regarding notice and hearing rights of owners of buildings are discussed infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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or, alternatively, to plead for a remedy more lenient than condemnation, such as repair or receivership.7 This scenario occurs
most often in poor communities, especially in urban areas. Owners, who are often maligned as "slumlords," use condemnations
to discontinue owning and managing buildings that no longer
yield profits.9 Tenants in these buildings find themselves
threatened with the destruction of their homes, with their landlord unavailable or uncooperative. 10
Asserting the procedural rights discussed in this Note may allow some tenants to contest condemnation, independently of
their landlord. At a hearing, tenants could attempt to prove that
the conditions required for condemnation are absent in their
case. At minimum, a hearing Would provide tenants an opportunity to plead for the least drastic, shelter-preserving remedy.
Tenants may prefer to continue residing in a building subject
to condemnation proceedings for a number of reasons. Although
federal law gives tenants displaced by government action prior7. Various alternatives to demolition, including repair, vacating the building, and receivership are discussed infra text accompanying notes 32-38, 76-79.
8. For a useful historical discussion of the rise of "the persistent model of the evil
slumlord," see L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING 39-44 (1968). Friedman
sees the slumlord as merely a scapegoat for more difficult underlying economic and
structural causes of inadequate rental housing. See also Blum & Dunham, Slumlordism
as a Tort-A Dissenting View, 66 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1968). For an opposing view that
the slumlord lies at the heart of the slum housing problem, see Sax & Hiestand,
Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869, 874 (1967) ("What is needed is a prolonged
program of economic pressure which strikes, and strikes hard, at the slumlord.").
9. Landlords confronted with a "dead-end" building often "hide or run until the
building no longer pays, either because its ruin is complete, because vandals have gutted
it, or because its cumulative illegality finally becomes so gross that the building is fined
to death, demolished by court order, or otherwise extirpated by law." L. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 8, at 43; see also New York City, the Landlord: A Decade of Housing Decay, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 8, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (nat'l ed.) (describing the fate of buildings after the city
takes them over for tax delinquency, fines, or other reasons).
10. The scenario of the "slumlord" does not exhaust the possible situations in which
tenants may wish to exercise their rights to contest the condemnation of their building.
For example, collusion between a landlord or real estate speculator and condemning authorities-scheming to get rid of troublesome tenants-may occur in areas where rentstabilization, rent control, or other regulation results in considerable disparity between
regulated rents and market rents, creating economic incentives to remove regulated
tenants. Once the building has been condemned, the schemers could rebuild after the
building has been demolished, or remodel for new rental or sale after the building has
been vacated. Urban areas experiencing real estate booms and gentrification seem particularly vulnerable to such collusive possibilities. For a discussion of the urban phenomenon of "gentrification," see, e.g., LeGates & Hartman, Gentrification-CausedDisplacement, 14 URa. LAW. 31 (1982); Marcuse, To Control Gentrification:Anti-Displacement
Zoning and Planning for Stable Residential Districts, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
931 (1984-85); Note, Gentrification, Tipping, and National Housing Policy, 11 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255 (1982-83) (authored by Alan M. White).
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ity for admission to federally assisted housing, 1 vacancies may
not exist in some communities. As a result, condemnation of a
tenant's building may force the tenant into homelessness. 2
Other considerations for wanting to stay in a particular building
may include a tenant's desire to remain living in the same neighborhood or to maintain family stability.
Unfortunately, the law regarding tenants' rights in condemnation proceedings remains underdeveloped. Many states simply
do not provide protection to tenants facing eviction due to
13
condemnation.
This Note explores the legal arguments available to tenants
who want to resist arbitrary or unjustified condemnations of
their buildings. Part I provides an overview of the legal and constitutional structure of the police power to condemn buildings.
Part II analyzes state statutes governing the condemnation of
buildings. Focusing on the statutory rights to notice and opportunity for a hearing provided to tenants, Part II concludes that a
majority of states provide inadequate protection for tenants facing eviction by condemnation. Part II then proposes statutory
reform, based on an approach taken by a minority of states. Part
III demonstrates that even in the absence of statutory requirements, states must guarantee procedural due process under the
fourteenth amendment, and often under similar provisions of
their own constitutions. These guarantees require notice and an
opportunity for a hearing to tenants of buildings that the government seeks to condemn.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1987) (preference given to poor families
who "occupy substandard housing . . . or are involuntarily displaced" in selection for
conventional public housing); 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1987) (same preference in selection for Section 8 Existing and Moderate Rehabilitation Programs); 12
U.S.C. § 1701s(k) (1988) (same preference for Rent Supplement Program); 53 Fed. Reg.
1121 (1988) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 215, 880-84, 886, 904-05, 960 (1989)) (preference
for conventional public housing, Section 8 housing, Rent Supplement housing); 24 C.F.R.
§ 236.70(c)(2) (1988) (preference for displaced persons in Section 236 housing); 24 C.F.R.
§§ 221.3, 221.537(c) (1988) (preference for displaced persons in Section 221(d)(3)
housing).
12. Eviction by condemnation exacerbates homelessness, given the scarcity of affordable substitute housing. Lack of affordable housing has been cited as a "primary cause"
of homelessness. The Federal Response to the Nameless Crisis: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 2d Sess. 5 (1984).
For recent studies on homelessness in the United States, see Hayes, supra note 2, at 82
n.10. See also Homeless Symposium, 31 WASH. U.J. Uae. & CONTEMP. L. 135 (1987).
13. State statutory law regarding tenants' rights to notice and hearing in police power
condemnations is surveyed infra text accompanying notes 91-105.
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I. THE POLICE POWER TO CONDEMN BUILDINGS
A state's power to condemn buildings derives from the state's
general police power."' In the United States, the police power is

recognized as an elastic concept, shaped by evolving purposes of
promoting the public welfare through the exercise of governmental power. 5 This Part focuses on the scope, limits, and constitutional structure of the police power with respect to buildings.
A. The Scope of the Police Power Over Buildings
The broad scope of the police power over buildings becomes
apparent when contrasted with the power of eminent domain
and by examining various methods of enforcement available
under the police power.
1. The police power and eminent domain- The police
power, a general governmental power, differs from the power of
eminent domain. If a court finds a public "regulation" to be legitimately within the bounds of the police power, the procedural
protections of eminent domain statutes requiring notice and a
hearing do not apply. In addition, unlike eminent domain practices, police power regulation often does not require payment of
"just compensation" for a "taking."
Under eminent domain, a government can condemn land, including buildings, for a public use such as a highway or a housing project. Eminent domain statutes and constitutional provisions require notice and opportunity for hearing for the
impending taking.' Moreover, the fifth amendment of the Con14. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 n.6 (1964); see also 6A E.
24.04 (3d ed. rev. 1981 & Supp. 1988); R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.2, at 517 (1984) [hereinafter R. CUNNINGHAM]. Blackstone defined the police power as " 'the due regulation
and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the individuals of the state, like members
of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of
propriety, good neighborhood and good manners.'.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*162 (quoted in 6A E. MCQUILLIN, supra, § 24.02).
15. E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER §§ 2-3 (1903). Sax notes that the police power has
"no exact definition." Sax, supra note 14, at 36 n.6 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26, 32 (1954)). For an historical account of judicial acceptance of an expanding police
power, see L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW, ch. 13
(1957).
16. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1116(c) (West Supp. 1988) (requiring notice
to all parties in interest and a hearing to inquire into "probable damages to each owner,
possessor or person having an interest"). See generally 0. REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW § 129 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
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stitution and parallel provisions of state constitutions require
the government to pay "just compensation" to the owner of the
condemned property.1 7 When an eminent domain condemnation
terminates a leasehold, the tenant may recover just compensation for the "bonus value" of the leasehold. This bonus value
equals the fair market value of the remaining term less the costs
18
of the tenant's remaining obligations.
Under the police power, however, a government may regulate
the use and condition of buildings over which it has jurisdiction
without paying compensation to those disadvantaged by the regulation. This police power over buildings includes the authority:
to abate nuisances,1 9 to enforce health and sanitation regulations, 0 to enforce fire safety regulations, s1 to set fire limits
within a city,"2 to enforce building construction codes,23 to enforce housing maintenance codes,"' to regulate use and occu-

17. The fifth amendment provides that "private property" shall not be "taken for
public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. It applies to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 14, § 9.1, at 510 (citing
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)). All but three state
constitutions have parallel provisions. Id. § 9.1, at 510-11 n.4 (citing 1 P. NICHOLS, THE
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.3, at 78-79 (J. Sackman 3d ed. rev. 1979)).
18. R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 14, § 6.35. Periodic, month-to-month tenancies may
not necessarily share in a condemnation award. Id. § 6.35 n.5 (Supp. 1985) (citing Missouri ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. St. Charles County Assocs., 698 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985)).
19. The traditional common law power to abate a "public nuisance" extends to buildings. See 7 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.558 (3d ed. rev. 1981 & Supp.
1988). For a general discussion of nuisances, see D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN
PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW, ch. 18 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter D.
HAGMAN].

20.

7 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 19, § 24.558.

21. Mandelker, Housing Codes, Building Demolition, and Just Compensation:A Rationale for the Exercise of Public Powers Over Slum Housing, 67 MICH. L. REV. 635, 64041 (1968-69) (describing model law regulating fire hazards and authorizing the remedy of
demolition for noncompliance). See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
22. Annotation, Constitutional Rights of Owner as Against Destruction of Building
by Public Authorities, 14 A.L.R. 2d 73, 80-82 (1950).
23.

7 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 19, §§ 24.525-.528.

24. For an account of this power and its history, see generally Note, The Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1965) (authored by Richard E.
Carlton, Richard Landfield & James B. Loken) [hereinafter Enforcement of Housing
Codes]. For a somewhat more recent treatment, see Rutzick & Huffman, The New York
City Housing Court: Trial and Error in Housing Code Enforcement, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV.
738 (1975).
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pancy of buildings,2 5 to zone,2 6 to eliminate urban
blight for the
28
27
purpose of urban renewal, and to control rent.
The police power over buildings differs from eminent domain
because proper exercise of the police power does not, by definition, result in a compensable taking.2 Thus when a building is
25. This aspect of the police power permits the adoption and enforcement of ordinances requiring owners of rental property to obtain certificates of occupancy and inspection. 7 E. McQuILLIN, supra note 19, § 24.552. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:482.12(m) (West Supp. 1987) (construed in Dome Realty v. City of Paterson, 83 N.J. 212,
416 A.2d 334 (1980)).
26. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See generally D.
HAGMAN, supra note 19, chs. 3-6; 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 16, §§ 116-21.
27. 7 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 19, § 24.563. Under this power, a government may
institute slum clearance programs, zone for low-rent districts, construct housing projects,
and create housing authorities and commissions. Id. § 24.563(a)-(c). See D. HAGMAN,
supra note 19, ch. 17.
28. 7 E. McQuILLIN, supra note 19, § 24.563(d); I. LEVEY, CONDEMNATION IN U.S.A.
§ 5.01, at 49-50 and n.10 (1969) (citations omitted). In Pennel v. City of San Jose, 485
U.S. 1 (1988), the Supreme Court upheld a broadly worded municipal rent control ordinance against due process and equal protection challenges, but postponed consideration
of the takings issue as "premature"; see also Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
29. Police power "takings" occupy a middle ground between clear cases of eminent
domain and legitimate noncompensable exercises of the police power. These "inverse
condemnation" cases allege that a compensable taking occurred through an unjustified
exercise of police power in the absence of formal condemnation procedures. See generally R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 14, § 9.2; D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, §§ 10.7, 20.2; 0.
REYNOLDS, supra note 16, § 125. The "takings" problem has engendered a host of academic articles, including The Jurisprudenceof Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1581 (1988);
Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation,
and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1982); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, supra note 14; Sax, Takings, PrivateProperty, and Public Rights,
81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by the Police Power: The
Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1971).
Inverse condemnation lies outside the scope of this Note, because the takings issue
arises after the fact of condemnation. The procedural rights of tenants addressed in this
Note concern what happens before condemnation.
Claims of a taking by tenants after a police power condemnation were rejected in
Devines v. Maier, 728 F.2d 876 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 836 (1984). In Devines,
tenants claimed a taking when the city ordered them temporarily to vacate their apartments under the authority of a housing code. In its original decision, the Seventh Circuit
upheld the takings claim, relying on previous Supreme Court holdings that "leasehold
interests are property interests protected by the Fifth Amendment." Devines v. Maier,
665 F.2d 138, 141 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S.
295 (1976) and United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946)). The Seventh
Circuit later reversed itself, however, holding that the state "created a property right
entitled to constitutional protection, (i.e., a possessory interest in a leasehold) but conditioned the retention of that right on a reasonable condition (i.e., inhabitability of the
leasehold)." 728 F.2d at 884.
Recent Supreme Court takings cases cast doubt on the continued vitality of Devines.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). In particular, First English solidly
affirmed that temporary takings were compensable. Nollan, finding a taking in a regula-
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condemned under legitimate exercise of the police power, the
owner is not compensated. Instead, the condemning authority
may require the owner to demolish the building at the owner's
expense or to reimburse the government for its demolition expenses." Also, in contrast to cases of eminent domain, the owner
of a building demolished under the police power retains ownership of the land upon which the building had stood.-1
2. Enforcement methods- Governments enforce regulations
concerning the use and condition of buildings in several ways.
For relatively minor violations of a housing or sanitation code,
the regulatory authority may simply order the owner to repair
the problem.32 In more serious cases, a government may order
temporary evacuation until repairs are made.3 3 Ultimately, a
government may enforce regulations over buildings through
condemnation.
Following condemnation, the enforcing agency may order a
building demolished or vacated. Because demolition is so drastic
a remedy, however, courts prefer alternative enforcement methods when feasible. 3 ' These alternatives to demolition include ordering the owner to repair or otherwise abate the nuisance or
defect in the building3 5 or ordering the occupants to vacate the
tory easement across beachfront property, may also suggest that the taking of a tenancy,
also a "partial" interest in property, must be compensated.
30. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.55.810-.830 (1981 & Supp. 1986).
31. Mandelker, supra note 21, at 635, 657 ("Title to the cleared site is not affected
[by a police power condemnation] and remains in the owner after the building has been
demolished."); I. LEVEY, supra note 28, § 5.01, at 46-47.
32. D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, § 8.6, at 252.
33. Id. Devines, 665 F.2d at 138 involved this type of enforcement method.
34. D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, § 8.6, at 252-53; Mandelker, supra note 21, at 647-48
("demolition is an extreme remedy to be ordered only in extreme cases"); Enforcement
of Housing Codes, supra note 24, at 832. Despite a preference for less severe measures,
courts have upheld government orders for demolition as a reasonable exercise of the police power to regulate buildings and housing. Mandelker, supra note 21, at 648-49. The
power to demolish is usually "limited to buildings in such bad physical repair that they
present a structural, fire, or other physical hazard." Id.
35. Enforcement of Housing Codes, supra note 24, at 832. Many state statutes explicitly require the agency condemning a building to give the owner the option of repairing or demolishing at the owner's expense. Courts have invalidated statutes not providing the owner this option. See, e.g., Albert v. City of Mountain Home, 81 Idaho 74, 337
P.2d 377 (1959) (allowing action for damages for demolition when no option to repair
had been given); Abraham v. City of Warren, 67 Ohio App. 492, 37 N.E.2d 390 (1940)
(holding that condemnation and demolition of building that evidence showed could have
been repaired, when notice had not been given to owner to repair, violated due process).
Some statutes also confer upon the condemning agency an affirmative "power to repair" and to bill the owner for costs. E.g., N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309(1)-(3) (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1989); see also Enforcement of Housing Codes, supra note 24, at 835

(discussing Baltimore's approach and the example of New York City's use of the "repair
power" in rat extermination programs).

FALL

19891

Tenants' Rights

building.3 6 Some courts also may appoint a receiver for a condemned building.3 7 Although less extreme from the owner's
point of view, vacating a building means the same thing as demolition to a tenant, namely, the loss of a home."8
B.

Federalism and the Police Power Over Buildings

In the United States, the police power over buildings remains
vested primarily in the states.3 9 The states, in turn, commonly
delegate this power to municipal corporations and counties. 4
Municipal corporations also possess impliedly delegated police
powers over buildings by virtue of their creation by the state
through a charter."2 "Home rule" provisions in many state constitutions and statutes expressly delegate to municipalities
36. D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, § 8.6, at 252; Enforcement of Housing Codes, supra
note 24, at 833-34.
37. D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, § 8.6, at 253; Enforcement of Housing Codes, supra
note 24, at 828-30; see also CONN. GEN.STAT. § 47a-56a-j (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:482.12 (h)-(l) (West 1967); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309(4)-(5) (McKinney 1974). This
alternative has not lived up to initial expectations given the difficulty of finding willing
receivers to take responsibility for substandard housing and the inefficiency of the judicial system in processing receivership cases. Sax & Hiestand, supra note 8, at 870-74;
Enforcement of Housing Codes, supra note 24, at 828-30. In New York City, the inability to find receivers for substandard apartment buildings has resulted in the city itself
becoming the landlord of 4,100 buildings with 33,000 families, a population roughly the
size of Pasadena, California. New York City, the Landlord, supra note 9, at 1, col. 1.
These buildings under city ownership are often in need of repair and, unfortunately,
once in the city's hands, are not often subject to the enforcement of housing codes. Id. at
35, col. 1.
38. Recognizing the severity of requiring occupants to vacate, a recent California
statute provides that
In deciding whether to require vacation of the building or to repair as necessary,
the enforcement agency shall give preference to the repair of the building whenever it is economically feasible to do so, without having to repair more than 75
percent of the dwelling, as determined by the enforcement agency, and shall give
full consideration to the needs for housing ...
CAL.HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 17980(b)(3) (West Supp. 1989).
. 39. E. FREUND, supra note 15, § 64 ("In the distribution of governmental powers
under the federal constitution, the bulk of the police power remains with the states.").
6A E. McQuILLIN, supra note 14, §§ 24.02 n.18 (citation omitted), 24.07 (describing the
police power as "absolutely inalienable in the state. Under our form of government the
police power belongs exclusively to sovereignty and inheres in the state.").
40. 6A E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 24.36; 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 16, § 55.
41. 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 16, § 8. The equivalent of counties exist in every state,
though called "parishes" in Louisiana and "boroughs" in Alaska.
42. 6A E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, §§ 24.36, 24.38. Mandelker argues that the demolition power "appears to be an exception to the usual rule that municipalities have only
those powers which are conferred by statutes or home-rule constitutional provisions, as
implemented through charter or local ordinance." Mandelker, supra note 21, at 639 n.21
(citing D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 220, 221 (1966)).
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broad police power over local affairs, including regulation of
buildings. 43 The federal government may exercise the police
power over buildings through congressional enactments under
constitutional powers such as the commerce clause."
1. The federal role- Although Congress has enacted sweeping urban renewal legislation designed to encourage state and local use of the police power to cure "slum" conditions and improve national housing,"' the Housing and Community
Development Act of 197441 began a retreat from direct federal
involvement with housing law.47
43. 7 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 19, § 24.33; 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 16, §§ 35-37
(providing a good overview of "home rule"). Approximately half of the states have
adopted home rule for counties. 0. REYNOLDS, supra, § 36, at 100 (citation omitted); see
also 2 E. MCQuILLIN. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 9.08 (3d ed. rev. 1979).
44. See, e.g., 6A E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 24.02.
45. The Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 2, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1982) and 42 U.S.C. (1982)), aimed specifically at "the
elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing through the clearance of slums
and blighted areas." 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982). The statute went on to state "the goal of a
decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family." Id. Under
the Act, federal grants and loans enabled local government agencies to pursue various
strategies to clear slums and improve housing. Attaching conditions to the aid allowed
the federal government to exert influence over local government housing programs utilizing the police power over buildings. 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 16, §§ 132, 134-36 (describing in detail the various conditions). One condition, for example, required local authorities to submit a relocation plan for displaced persons before proceeding with a particular
urban renewal program or low-income housing project. 0. REYNOLDS, supra, §§ 445, 45253; D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, at 528, 532.
46. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C. (1982), 12 U.S.C. (1982), 20 U.S.C. (1982), 31 U.S.C. (1982), 42 U.S.C. (1982),
and 49 U.S.C. (1982)).
47. Congress has terminated direct federal involvement with urban renewal projects
and substituted a system of revenue sharing "block grants." D. HAGMAN, supra note 19,
§ 17.7. This approach reduces the federal role to one of oversight: reviewing applications
for block grants and monitoring the progress of local housing programs using them. In
this way, federal retrenchment frees state and local government housing programs from
extensive federal interference, but simultaneously removes an important potential source
of statutory and regulatory protection of tenants. Id. § 17.8, at 551 ("Federal involvement has generally been pared to a minimum.").
The focus of the federal government has turned instead to alternatives such as providing tax incentives to encourage rehabilitation and local government investment through
tax increment financing. Id; see also Davidson, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool for
Community Redevelopment, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 405 (1979); Note, Urban Redevelopment: Utilization of Tax Increment Financing,19 WASHBURN L.J. 536 (1980) (authored
by Randall V. Reece & M. Duane Coyle). For a brief account of the effects on housing
development under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085
(1986), which included a Low-Income Housing Credit to spur investment, see Bozung &
McRoberts, Land Use, Planning and Zoning in 1987: A National Survey, 19 URB. LAW.
899, 951-55 (1987).
Another new approach argues for the creation of "enterprise zones," defined as "locally
nominated, federally designated and economically deteriorated urban area[s] into which
commercial activity is to be attracted . . . by means of a partial roll-back of federal and
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A significant exception relevant to police power condemnations appears in federal requirements for uniform procedures to
provide relocation assistance to displaced persons. The Uniform
Relocation Assistance Act of 198748 requires all "[p]rograms or
projects undertaken by a Federal agency or with Federal financial assistance" to adopt a "relocation assistance advisory program." This program must, among other things,
assure that a person shall not be required to move from a
dwelling unless the person has had a reasonable opportunity to relocate to a comparable replacement dwelling,
except in case of(A) a major disaster...
(B) a national emergency declared by the President; or
(C) any other emergency which requires the person to
move immediately from the dwelling because continued
occupancy of such dwelling by such person constitutes a
substantial danger to the health or safety of such
person.4 9
Procedural regulations adopted pursuant to the Act also require
ninety-day "relocation notices" to people scheduled for displacement and provide for appeals from determinations of eligibility
for relocation payments. 50 But neither the Act nor the regulations under it stipulate any procedural rights for tenants respecting notice and a hearing on the merits of the original causes
of displacement, including police power condemnations of
tenants' buildings.
2. The primacy of state statutes- Given the retreat of the
federal government from the housing area, the states remain the
primary, and virtually the exclusive, arbiters of the police power
over buildings.5 1 Local government ordinances and regulations
local taxes and elimination of local regulations." Callies & Tamashiro, Enterprise Zones:
The Redevelopment Sweepstakes Begin, 15 URB. LAW. 231 (1983) (discussing the British
experience with enterprise zones).
48. Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132 (1987) (amending the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894 (1971) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4601-02, 4604, 4621-38, 4651-55 (1982))). Newly adopted regulations promulgated under this act appear in 49 C.F.R. pt. 24 (1988).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 4625 (Supp. V 1987).
50. 49 C.F.R. § 24.203 (1988).
51. Federal preemption largely disappeared with passage of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, § 8.5, at 250. Even before
the Act, however, cases of federal preemption in housing law were rare. 0. REYNOLDS,
supra note 16, § 48. For example, courts have generally held that federal rent control of
low-income housing does not preempt local rent control ordinances. Id. (citing Kargman
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may not conflict with state statutes.2 Even home rule local governments, granted full constitutional powers over local matters
by state statutes or constitutional provisions,5 3 must conform to
state law, 54 though some home-rule ordinances occasionally prevail over state statutes when addressing matters of purely local
concern.5 5 Courts generally have read state statutes to preempt
conflicting home rule regulation in the exercise of the police
power, including regulation of buildings.5 6 Ultimate authority
over local governmental condemnations therefore resides in state
legislatures.
C. Limits to the Police Power Over Buildings
Limits to the police power over buildings come from a number
of sources, including the origins of the power in equity, state and
federal constitutional provisions, and state and local statutes.
Equitable principles constrain the police power over buildings
by limiting its scope and appropriate application. Because the
v. Sullivan, 552 F.2d 2 (1st Cir. 1977)). But see City of Boston v. Hills, 420 F. Supp. 1291
(Mass. 1976) (federal administrative regulation may preempt local rent legislation).
The uniform relocation assistance requirements, which specifically apply to any "State
or State agency" that "displaces a person," constitute an exception to this rule. 49 C.F.R.
24.2(a) (1989). See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
52. See, e.g., Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) (upholding the principle of
complete state supremacy over municipalities and other state subdivisions).
53. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Home rule arrangements vary considerably among the states. 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 16, § 35, at 96. Usually, home rule
provisions require incorporation, a minimum population, a charter, approval of the charter by local voters, and state approval of the home rule entity. 0. REYNOLDS, supra, § 36,
at 98-99.
54. 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 16, § 27 (doctrine of "inherent" home rule "almost universally rejected;" "general rule of complete state control"). See also Sandalow, The
Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV.
643 (1964).
For arguments that the "new federalism" should translate into greater independence
for municipal and local government from state control, see Frug, Empowering Cities in a
Federal System, 19 URB. LAW. 553 (1987); Libonati, Reconstructing Local Government,
19 URB. LAW. 645 (1987).
55. 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 16, § 36, at 99. For example, local governments may
prevail in choosing the procedures for electing and constituting the local government
itself.
56. Id. § 39 ("The police power, to the extent it resides in municipal governments, is
delegated from the state; and most 'police power matters' are considered of statewide
concern."). Minor exceptions to the rule sometimes include traffic regulations of city
streets and specific types of zoning, such as the height or set back limits of buildings. Id.
Accord 7 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 19, § 24.510.
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power to order demolition of a building originated in equity,5 7
courts customarily have held that a government cannot order a
building demolished without a judicial determination that the
building is a "nuisance in fact.""8 Demolition of a building not
previously found a nuisance in fact can result in liability in tort
for damages. 9
Equitable principles also encourage courts to apply the least
severe enforcement method to any particillar problem, suggesting, for example, that a court directly abate a noxious use of
a building, rather than resort to the power to vacate or demolish.6 Courts should therefore employ less drastic alternative
remedies, including enjoining tenants or evacuating the building
for a short time, to cure unsanitary, unsafe, or otherwise improper use of a building by its tenants.6e
Constitutional guarantees also limit the police power over
buildings.6 2 The fifth amendment and parallel provisions of state
constitutions require just compensation for damages caused to
buildings under exercise of the police power if deemed a taking. a In addition, the fourteenth amendment and similar clauses
in state constitutions require procedural due process in police
57. Mandelker, supra note 21, at 639-40 ("The authority to demolish substandard
structures had its origins in the common-law power of municipalities to demolish buildings as public nuisances," a power that "was actually established in equity."). Cf. Enforcement of Housing Codes, supra note 24, at 826-33 (describing the power to demolish
as summary emergency power allowing equitable relief of housing code violations) (citing
2 J. KENT COMMENTARIES *338-39 and C. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW § 26-21 (1957)).
58. Mandelker, supra note 21, at 646-47 ("Even if a statute does not explicitly provide that only buildings which are in fact nuisances can be demolished, the courts often
read such a limitation into the legislation.") (citations omitted). Mandelker notes that
demolition cases holding to the contrary follow the trend in other areas of land use regulation favoring a more modern due process emphasis on reasonableness. These cases uphold demolition if reasonable under all of the circumstances, without regard to the question of "nuisance in fact." Id. at 647. Nonetheless, the rule remains that "[b]ecause most
of the demolition cases are based on the nuisance rationale originated in equity, they
start with the basic equitable premise that demolition is an extreme remedy to be ordered only in extreme cases." Id. at 647-48 (citing Village of Zumbrota v. Johnson, 280
Minn. 390, 161 N.W.2d 626 (1968) and Polsgrove v. Moss, 154 Ky. 408, 157 S.W. 1133
(1913)).
59. Enforcement of Housing Codes, supra note 24, at 832 (citing Albert v. City of
Mountain Home, 81 Idaho 74, 337 P.2d 377 (1959)). In theory at least, displaced tenants
could also maintain a tort action for damages on this ground, perhaps in connection with
an action against the landlord for breach of the warranty of implied habitability or constructive eviction. See R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 14, § 6.84.
60. See Mandelker, supra note 21, at 648 (noting "the reluctance of equity to order
demolition when the substandard condition arises from mere use of the building") (citations omitted).
61. Cf. Enforcement of Housing Codes, supra note 24, at 833-34.
62. 6A E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 24.09, at 30-32.
63. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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power regulation of buildings." Before condemning a building,
government authorities must provide sufficient notice and a
proper hearing-the traditional protection of procedural due
process. 5 Rare emergencies occasionally qualify for exceptions
to these requirements. 6
Finally, because local regulations and ordinances generally
may not supersede state statutes, 7 these statutes pose another
set of limitations to the police power over buildings.
II.

STATE STATUTORY RIGHTS: REALITY AND REFORM

All of the states limit local governments in their exercise of
the police power to condemn buildings by various statutes. Examining the procedures available under the condemnation power
reveals these statutory constraints.
A.

Applicable State Procedures

States have a number of procedures available for exercising
the power to condemn, including the extreme remedies of demolition and vacating a building, both of which effectively destroy
a tenant's interest in the building.
64. 7 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 19, § 24.561. See discussion infra Part III.
65. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
Part III of this Note discusses in detail the requirements of procedural due process in
the context of police power condemnations. The resurrection of substantive due process
in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), appears limited to zoning that intrudes
into the privacy of the family without a compelling public purpose. See D. HAGMAN,
supra note 19, § 10.2.
66. Prevention of the spread of fire, for example, permits summary destruction of a
building. Annotation, supra note 22, at 78-82; 7 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 19, § 24.561;
16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 588 (1979).
Other constitutional limitations also may constrain the exercise of the police power
over buildings. For example, discriminatory enforcement of housing or building codes
may result in equal protection violations. D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, § 8.7, at 258 (citing
Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1039 (1983); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1101 (1984)). For an overview of constitutional limitations on land use control regulation, see D. HAGMAN, supra, §§ 10.1, 10.2 (substantive due process), 10.4 (equal protection), 10.5 (free speech). Like the takings issue, these constitutional questions lie outside
the procedural scope of this Note. See supra note 29.
67. 7 E. McQuILLIN, supra note 19, § 24.510; 6 E. MCQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 20.41, .46, .54 (3d ed. rev. 1980 & Supp. 1987); C. SANDS & M. LIBONATI, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW ch. 3 (1981).

FALL

1989]

Tenants' Rights

1. Demolition- In a leading article, 8 Professor Mandelker
provides a comprehensive analysis of the various demolition
statutes enacted by the states. According to his analysis, the
demolition power, originating as an equitable remedy, grew out
of the judicial power to abate nuisances.0 He finds further authority for this power in the enactment of local housing and
building codes 70 and in state demolition statutes for buildings
or are otherwise dangerous, unsafe,
that constitute fire 7hazards
1
unfit.
or
unsanitary,
In the current statutory landscape, some states continue to
delegate to local governments the power to demolish buildings
solely through the power to abate nuisances. 72 Most states, however, have enacted specific statutes delegating the power to demolish buildings determined "unsafe," "dangerous," ".unfit,"
"unsanitary," "dilapidated," "substandard," or some combination of these characteristics. 7 3 A separate category of statutes
68. Mandelker, supra note 21.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
70. Mandelker, supra note 21, at 640.
71. Id. at 640-42. The latter type of statute, granting broad demolition powers beyond traditional "nuisance in fact" standards, responded to a perceived housing crisis in
the 1950s and 1960s. Id.
72. E.g., ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-240 (to towns) and § 9-276 (to cities) (West 1977
& Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-203,-209 (1986) (delegating power to county
commissioners to adopt broad ordinances including power to abate nuisances); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 7-5-4104(1) (1987) (to towns and cities); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 266.335 (to
cities), 244.360 (to counties) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 9-29-13 (1981) (to
municipalities).
Statutes delegating the power to local governments to abate nuisances in general often
coexist with other authorizing statutes that specifically describe what kind of buildings
may be condemned. E.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.541, .539 (West 1986) (specific
statute authorizing abatement of "dangerous" buildings), § 45.515 (West 1986 & Supp.
1988) (general power of counties to abate nuisances), § 67.1 (West 1967) (general power
of towns to abate nuisances). See also N.Y. MULT. RESID. LAW § 305 (McKinney Supp.
1987) (nuisances generally); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309(1) (McKinney 1974) (specific
statute authorizing abatement of "dangerous" buildings), § 309(2) (McKinney 1974)
("untenanted hazards"); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 130(1) and (16) (McKinney 1987) (unsafe or
dangerous buildings).
Grounds of "nuisance" may also be incorporated in a more specific authorizing statute.
E.g., N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309(1) (McKinney 1974) (delegating to cities, towns and
villages power to define and abate "nuisances" as well as "dangerous" buildings); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2851 (1983) (municipalities may abate a building as a nuisance
if structurally unsafe, unstable, unsanitary, a fire hazard, unsuitable or improper for use
or occupancy, a hazard due to inadequate maintenance, dilapidated, obsolescent, abandoned, or otherwise unsafe); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 221.915, .916(10) (1987) (general municipal police powers over "any and all" subjects "concerning the public morals, public
safety, public health, and public convenience" as well as over nuisances).
73. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.55.750 (1986) ("unfit"); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 17960, 18901-18949 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989) ("substandard" as defined by State
Building Standards Code, with a number of subcategories); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31,
§ 4127 (1985) ("unsafe" or "unfit"); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 24, para. 11-31-1(a), ch. 34, para.
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delegates demolition power over buildings deemed fire hazards."'
Other statutes authorize local governments to adopt building
and housing codes, with the power of demolition granted explicitly or implicitly as a remedy. 5
2. Vacating a building and other enforcement methodsThe power to vacate a building generally follows the same statutory structure as the power to demolish."6 The power to con429.8 (1987) ("dangerous and unsafe"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 364.12(3)(c) (West 1976)
("dangerous"); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.541, .539 (West 1986) ("dangerous"),
§ 333.2455 (West 1980) (insanitary nuisances); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 463.15 (West Supp.
1988) ("hazardous"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-1722 (1983) ("unsafe"); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:48-1 (West Supp. 1986) ("dangerous"), § 40:48-2.3 (West 1967) ("unfit"), § 40:482.12(a) (West 1967) ("harmful to the health and safety" of occupants or general public);
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309(1) (1974) ("dangerous"), § 309(2) (McKinney 1974) ("untenanted hazards"); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 130(1) and (16) (McKinney 1987) (unsafe or dangerous); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 715.26(B) (Anderson Supp. 1988) ("insecure, unsafe, or
structurally defective"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 22-112 (Supp. 1988) ("dilapidated"); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 215.605, .615 (1985) (substandard according to county housing codes);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-21-102 (1987) ("unfit for human occupation or use"); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1015(24) (Vernon 1963) ("dangerous" and "liable to fall"); WASH.
REV. CODE § 35.80.010 (1987) ("unfit"); W. VA. CODE § 8-12-16 (1984) ("unfit for human
habitation"); WYo. STAT. § 15-1-103(a)(xxvi) (1980) ("dangerous"). A complete list of
state statutes and the conditions allowing demolition is on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform.
74.' E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 633.081 (Harrison Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 100.13
(West 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2393 (1988); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 143, § 9
(1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 29.9, 29.23 (West 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-513
(1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 477.110 (1987) (authorizing only "changes to existing structures to enhance the safety of occupants from fire"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3737.45
(Anderson 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-9-150 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
More general statutes also often include this ground for demolition. These statutes
specifically authorize demolition for purposes of fire prevention and usually give the
state fire marshal or designated deputy the power to order demolition. Under more general statutes, choice of the enforcement authority is left to local governments. E.g., N.D.
CENT. CODE § 40-05-02 (1983) ("substandard" according to local ordinance and including "fire hazard," "dangerous," or "dilapidated").
75. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 36-61-11 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-8-4 (West Supp.
1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23B, § 22(11) (1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 67.400 (Vernon Supp.
1989); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 266.335, 244.360 (1985) (authorizing passage of ordinances defining nuisances), §§ 268.413, 268.3675 (1985) (authorizing passage of ordinances to "regulate all matters relating to the construction, maintenance and safety of buildings"); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46202(5) and (24) (Purdon 1966 & Supp. 1989) (power to adopt
building and housing codes and to abate nuisances); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1165
(Vernon 1963) (providing for home rule cities); WASH. REV. CODE § 35.80.010 (1987); W.
VA. CODE § 8-12-16 (1984).
Most housing and building code ordinances provide for civil and even criminal penalties for noncompliance. Under the Model Penal Code, for example, an owner may be
subject to criminal sanctions for causing or risking a "catastrophe," defined as including
"collapse of a building." MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2 (1962). For a state provision following this model, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3302, 3303 (Purdon 1983).
76. Enforcement of Housing Codes, supra note 24, at 832-34.

FALL

1989]

Tenants' Rights

demn encompasses both remedies. 7 Like demolition, vacating a
building severely inconveniences tenants, throwing them temporarily or permanently out of their homes.78 Other remedies short
of demolition, such as ordering repair or fining the owner for
building or housing code violations, have a similar statutory
structure.79
3. The complexity of multiple authorizing statutes- Under
the usual statutory scheme of delegation, a number of local government entities, including specialized housing agencies, may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the same buildings. Such
complexity occasionally leads to jurisdictional disputes and
questions regarding what law or ordinance governs a particular
case."0 Complicating matters further, many delegating statutes
specifically exempt certain sources of the police power to condemn buildings, such as the common law power over nuisances
and broad powers of home rule."1 This complexity creates a
problem when a claimant asserts procedural or substantive
rights under one state statute and a condemning agency responds that it is operating under a different authority.
Some states resolve this problem by granting power to state
agencies or departments to resolve jurisdictional disputes.8 2
77. Id.; D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, § 8.7, at 258; cf. 7 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 19,
§§ 24.560-.561.
78. D. HAGMAN, supra note 19, § 8.7, at 258. See supra text accompanying notes 3538. For a recent example, see Devines v. Maier, 728 F.2d 876 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 836 (1984), discussed supra note 29.
79. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
80. Enforcement of Housing Codes, supra note 24, discusses this problem in the context of code enforcement.
81. E.g., ALA. CODE § 11-53-3 (1985) (excluding municipal powers to abate nuisances
from coverage); COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-35-201 (1986) (example of broad ordinance power
under home rule); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, para. 429.8 (1987) (home rule units explicitly
exempted from coverage of the statute); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 463.26 (West Supp. 1989)
(explicitly stating that the general statute authorizing demolition is "supplementary to
other statutory and charter provisions and do[es] not limit the authority of any city to
enact and enforce ordinances on the same subject"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-A:9-10
(1970) (excluding municipal powers to abate nuisances from coverage); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:48-2.5 (West Supp. 1988) (excluding municipal powers to abate nuisances and any
authority to enforce State Uniform Construction Code); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-15-40, 3115-340 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (excluding municipal and county powers to abate nuisances
from coverage); WASH. REV. CODE § 35.80.030(6) (1987) (excluding nuisance abatement
provisions from coverage).
82. For example, California, Delaware, and Rhode Island have adopted a State Housing Code applicable to all local government units. Local officials under such a system
have direct responsibility for enforcing state law. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1890118949 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989) (State Building Standards Code), §§ 17960 (West 1984)
(enforcement provision); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, §§ 4108, 4110 (1985) (providing responsibility to enforce State Housing Code adopted in 1985 and providing for coordination of
enforcement to prevent multiple or conflicting orders); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-27.3-107.1
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Statutes may also grant priority to one local government unit
over another in cases where jurisdictions overlap. 3
Absent a controlling state statute, courts must construe the
state's particular statutory and constitutional framework delegating the police power to condemn. As a general rule, rights
asserted under state statutes prevail over municipal ordinances
due to the supremacy of states in matters concerning the police
power over buildings.8 4
B.

ProceduralRights of Owners and Tenants under State

Statutes
Most states require any agency contemplating condemnation
to give the owner of the building reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing, either before the condemning agency itself
with a right of appeal or before a local court.8 5 Statutes not re(1985) (granting local authorities power to administer State Building Code), § 23-27.3100.1.7 (withdrawing local authority over codes to prevent possible conflict with state
law).
Oregon has endowed a Housing Division with broad powers to provide financial support to low-income housing and to encourage rehabilitation and refinancing, powers that
could extend to coordination of code enforcement activities. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 456.554,
456.559 (1987). At the same time, a State Housing Council seems to exercise related
powers. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 456.567, 456.571 (1987). For an account of Oregon's statewide
approach, see Morgan & Shonkwiler, Statewide Land Use Planning in Oregon with Special Emphasis on Housing Issues, 11 URB. LAW. 1 (1979).
New Jersey's State Housing Code sets minimum standards with which any municipality adopting ordinances under the state rent control act must comply. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:42-76 (West 1987).
83. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, para. 429.8 (1987) (demolition power of county does
not apply within the jurisdiction of home rule units); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 244.368, 278.580
(1987) (more stringent city codes take precedence over county codes within three-mile
radius of city limits).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
85. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.55.780, .790 (1986) (service of complaint required, followed by hearing ten to thirty days after service); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 17980,
17989 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989) (thirty days notice before order, followed by additional
five days notice after order to comply); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 4128 (1985) (written
notice requirement, opportunity to repair, and right to appeal for modification); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 24, para. 11-31-1, ch. 34, para. 429.8 (1987) (fifteen days notice by mail before
required court hearing); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1752, -1753 (1982) (thirty days notice and
"reasonable time" to comply with order after hearing); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 143, § 6; ch.
145, § 60 (1986) (notice by service of process); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 125.540 (West
1986) (notice specifying time and place for hearing to show cause); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 463.17, .18, .20 (West Supp. 1989) (order to repair or be subject to summary enforcement required by service of process, twenty days for answer, and provision for hearing of
contested cases); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:48-2.5 (West Supp. 1988) (notice by service of process); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-18-5 (1985) (notice, hearing, and right to appeal generally
provided); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309(1) (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1989) (twenty-one
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quiring notice and a hearing for the owner have been declared
unconstitutional, 6 though emergency condemnations constitute
a major exception to this rule.8 7 Local governments must adhere
strictly to statutory notice and hearing provisions." And an
days to abate condition; less time if "imminent danger" exists); N.Y. MULT. RESiD. LAW
§§ 305(2), 306 (McKinney 1952 & Supp. 1989) (thirty days notice to abate condition, or
less if emergency exists, and "special proceeding in the supreme court" required for order to vacate or demolish); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 130 (16) (McKinney 1987) (general notice
provision); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 715.26(B) (Anderson 1988) (thirty days notice; less if
emergency exists); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-11.2(2) (1981) ("reasonable notice and a reasonable time" to comply with an order); W. VA. CODE § 8-12-16 (1984) (generally provides
that "complaints and orders" must be issued); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 66.05 (West 1965 &
Supp. 1988) (service of process, court order to demolish or vacate required, and hearing
to appeal order must be held within twenty days). A complete list of state statutes and
their procedural requirements is on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform.
See also 7 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 19, §§ 24.560 (notice and hearing required for
vacation), 24.561 (notice and hearing required for demolition).
86. Rowland v. State ex rel. Martin, 129 Fla. 622, 176 So. 545 (1937), struck down an
ordinance enacted under the old general demolition statute of Florida, FLA. STAT.
§ 167.05 (1966), which did not provide for a hearing. The ordinance violated procedural
due process. Florida subsequently repealed § 167.05, 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-129, § 5, at
the same time conferring home rule powers to municipalities. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 166.021,
166.042 (West 1989). Given that Rowland relied on constitutional grounds, notice and
hearing requirements would logically remain effective under the new statutory scheme.
Johnson v. City of Paducah, 512 S.W.2d 514 (Ky. 1974), similarly held unconstitutional under the state constitution an ordinance that did not give the owner of a building
reasonable time to comply with a repair order. Like Florida, Kentucky repealed the judicially invalidated statutes. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80.660, 80.670 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1980). Johnson nonetheless appears to apply to ordinances enacted under other enabling
statutes. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.420, 82.081, 82.082 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1980) (delegation of general municipal powers).
87. Many of the general demolition statutes contain express exceptions for emergencies. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 4130 (1985) ("emergency orders" provided for, but
certain notice provisions and appeal rights still required); D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-513 (1988)
(summary powers given to mayor given "life or health threatening condition"); IND. CODE
ANN. § 36-7-9-9 (West Supp. 1989) ("emergency action" that "must be limited to removing any immediate danger"; notice nonetheless required); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33:4762(C) (West 1988) (twenty-four hour notice required); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 70.11, 109.11 (West 1967) (to prevent spread of fire); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-27.3-125.5
(1985) ("immediate danger"). See Busch v. City of Augusta, 9 Kan. App. 2d 119, 674
P.2d 1054 (1983) (upholding under a Kansas statute a demolition without prior notice
after a fire).
Municipalities also commonly enact summary emergency procedures pursuant to state
enabling legislation. Demolitions carried out under such procedures have been upheld.
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Garret, 91 Ill. Dec. 127, 136 Ill. App. 3d 529, 483 N.E.2d 409
(1985) (upholding summary demolition under municipal ordinance in an emergency
caused by snow caving in a roof).
These statutory exceptions reflect the constitutional emergency exception. See infra
text accompanying notes 195-98.
88. Thomas v. Freeman Wrecking Co., 388 So.2d 968 (Ala. 1980); Housemaster Corp.
v. City of Kenner, 374 So.2d 1240 (La. 1979); Hepner v. Township Comm., 115 N.J.
Super. 155, 278 A.2d 513 (1971); Farmers Bank of Sunbury v. City of Elizabeth, 54 N.C.
App. 110, 282 S.E.2d 580 (1981).
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owner may demand adherence to notice and hearing requirements by the exceptional procedures of mandamus or
injunction."9
Most of the procedural protections under state statutes covering owners also extend to mortgagees, lienholders, and certain
other parties in interest concerned with the condemned property.9 0 Tenants and other occupants, however, have usually not
been deemed "parties in interest" under these statutes. 1
In contrast to this regime of protection to owners and other
parties in interest, only a minority of states provide tenants with
similar protection. A small number of statutes provide tenants
with procedural rights that virtually mirror the rights provided
to owners. 2 Other statutes appear to extend limited protection
to tenants, but are not specific regarding the extent of coverage.9 In addition, even explicit statutory protections for tenants
may not apply if the condemning agency successfully claims to
be acting under a different statutory or constitutional authority. 4
89. 7 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 19, § 24.562; 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 16, § 207.
90. See the statutes cited supra note 85.
91. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2851, tit. 14, § 6321 (1983 & Supp. 1988).
92. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1752, -1753 (1982) (notice and opportunity for hearing for
"any occupant" required); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 127B (1987) ("written notice and an
opportunity for a public hearing" required to be given occupants, but similar provisions
do not appear in other relevant Massachusetts statutes); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 463.17
(West Supp. 1989) (requiring notice to be served on "occupying tenant, if there is one");
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 67.410(3) (Vernon Supp. 1989) (notice to any "lessee"); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 155-B:4 (1978) (same language as Minnesota); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-443, 442(5) (1987) ("parties in interest" defined to include persons "in possession"); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 13-21-103(2), -101(6) (1987) ("parties in interest" defined to include "any
who are in possession"); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.05(3), (7) (West 1965 & Supp. 1988) (service of process required on "occupant").
93. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, §§ 4128, 4133 (1985) (notice must be given to "person
responsible" of any State Housing Code violation and of "intent to placard and to order
vacation;" application to restrain demolition order can be made by "[alnyone affected");
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4762 (West 1988) (notice to "occupant" required, but only if
owner absent from state and only in cities other than New Orleans); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-15-30, 31-15-330 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (provisions for notice to "persons in possession".may"
be included in ordinances); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3113 (1975) (written
notice required to "person having an interest" in the building, a term not defined).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82. One state statute may require notice to
tenants; but under another statute, under common law, or under a home rule constitutional provision, no such notice may be required. Thus, the statutes cited supra notes 9293 do not necessarily require notification of tenants in any condemnation proceeding
occurring within the entire state. Although some statutes seem to require notice to
tenants in any condemnation proceeding, no matter what the statutory authority, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, §§ 4108, 4128 (1985) (requiring affirmative duty to enforce State
Housing Code and comply with procedural provisions), others do not. Many probably do
not extend so far as to bind home rule units.
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Some state statutes that do not require notice and opportunity for hearing to tenants at least require a judicial determination as to condemnation and allow an appeal by any party affected by the decision. 5 State rent control legislation also may
confer rights to tenants against evictions, including those
threatened through condemnation proceedings."6
A few recently enacted state statutes provide tenants fairly
comprehensive rights to notice and a hearing. California recently
amended a statute to require that
notwithstanding local ordinances, tenants in a residential
building shall be provided notice of any violation [of the
state housing or building code] which affects the health
and safety of the occupants . . . , an order of the code
enforcement agency issued after inspection of the premises declaring the dwelling to be substandard, the enforcement agency's decision to repair or demolish, or the
issuance of a building or demolition permit following the
abatement order of an enforcement agency.97
Under this statute, the enforcement agency may charge the
owner with the cost of providing notice,9" and tenants must receive notice before the condemning agency applies to a court for
99
an enforcement order.
Delaware's State Housing Code also protects tenants by requiring code enforcement officials to serve written notice of an
intent to condemn a building to "the occupants" as well as the
95. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-15-70 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (providing that "[ainy person
affected" by a demolition or vacation order may petition a court for an injunction to
restrain the action, with the hearing to occur within twenty days of the request); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 13-21-106 (1987) (virtually identical to South Carolina); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
24, § 3117 (1975) (appeal permitted by "person interested"); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 35.80.030(1)(g) (1987) (appeal rights to "party in interest").
96. See, e.g., N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8581-8589 (Emergency Housing Rent Control
Act), 8621-8634 (Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974) (McKinney 1987). Rent and
Eviction Regulations adopted under these statutes by the State Division of Housing and
Community Renewal allow eviction or other method of dispossession only upon certain
grounds, including orders to demolish or vacate. Even then, however, in condemnation
cases, tenants must get ten days notice and a hearing before a court on the grounds for
eviction; in some other cases, tenants must get seven days notice. The regulations explicitly state that no tenant covered under rent control "shall be removed or evicted unless
and until such removal or eviction has been authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction." Rent and Eviction Regulations §§ 2104.1-.3, 2504.1-.3, reprinted in N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS (McKinney 1989).
97. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17980(c) (West Supp. 1989).
98. Id. § 17980(e).
99. Id. §§ 17982-83 (West 1984).
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owner. 10 0 The notice must include "an explanation of the
owner's and/or occupant's right to seek modification or withdrawal of the notice by a petition to a Board of Appeals."1 ' ' Any
person adversely affected by a local board's decision may appeal
to this State Board of Appeals and ultimately to a state court."0 2
A hearing at the condemnation stage permits tenants to argue
against condemnation and for alternative plans to repair, finance, and stay in their present building. At a hearing, tenants
may raise objections to the condemnation of their building, arguing, for example, that applicable statutory requirements (e.g.,
"dilapidated," "structurally unsound," or "unfit for human
habitation") do not describe their building. Alternatively, tenants may plead for less drastic enforcement methods, such as
undertaking repairs themselves or having a receiver appointed.0 3 A hearing could also allow tenants to assert rights to
relocation benefits or replacement housing. 0 4
In a majority of states, however, tenants are not afforded a
statutory right to notice and an opportunity for a hearing in police power condemnations.' 6 In these states, it is the building's
owner who is given the opportunity to make a case against condemnation on behalf of tenants-or to make no case at all.
C.

A Proposal for Statutory Reform

Because tenants cannot always depend upon owners to oppose
police power condemnations, 10 every state should enact statutes
to protect the important and independent property interests of
tenants in the buildings in which they live. Any government
agency's condemnation action should provide tenants with written notice of the intent to condemn, a right to appear at a con100.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 4128 (1985).
101. Id. tit. 31, § 4128(b)(5).
102. Id. tit. 31, § 4132(d).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 34-38.
104. Federal relocation assistance provisions may impose these requirements. See
supra text accompanying notes 48-50. Some states have adopted parallel provisions. See,
e.g., MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 213.321-.332 (West 1986).
105. The following states appear to have no requirements for giving notice and an
opportunity for a hearing to tenants in police power condemnation proceedings (excluding state fire marshal demolition provisions): Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10.
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demnation hearing, and a right to appeal an adverse determination to a state court. States not providing such protection should
amend their statutes authorizing local governments to condemn
buildings so that the provisions for notice and an opportunity
for a hearing given to owners includes "tenants" and
"occupants." 1 7
In considering how to amend a particular state's statutes to
accord procedural rights to tenants, legislators should remember
that a variety of statutes may be involved. Amending some state
statutes, for example, may not cover local governments operating under home rule.1 08 In these cases, a state housing code that
includes tenant notice and hearing protections may provide a
more effective solution. 1 9 A tenant protection measure embedded in a statewide code has the advantage of universal application to all local governments within the state, regardless of home
rule provisions and delegating statutes.
States also could simply adopt a new statute to protect the
procedural interests of tenants faced with condemnation proceedings. Legislators could draw on the models of California and
Delaware, "0 at the same time ensuring that the statute covers
all of the various delegating statutes of the state. The statute
should provide for a hearing in a local court prior to any order of
condemnation. Written notice of the hearing served on all affected tenants should require: (1) a description of the building
sufficient to identify it; (2) a description of the code or ordinance
violations giving rise to the problem; (3) an account of any repairs or improvements that the landlord has been ordered to undertake;1 (4) a statement of the time, date, and place of a hearing on condemnation; (5) an explanation of the tenant's rights at
the hearing, including the right to contest the police power action and the right to plead for alternative enforcement methods;
(6) an explanation of the tenant's rights to relocation benefits
and comparable replacement housing, if the condemnation ulti107. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 463.17 (West Supp. 1989) (requiring notice to be
served on "occupying tenant, if there is one") and N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-B:4 (1977)
(same). Amendments should include all forms of tenancies, even periodic tenancies. For
a discussion of the different types of tenancies, see R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 14,
§§ 6.13-.20; R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 2:1 to 2:26
(1980 & Supp. 1989).
108. See supra text accompanying note 81.
109. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 31, ch. 41 (1985).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 97-102.
111. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 4128(b)(1)-(3) (1985).
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mately results in an eviction;11 2 and (7) a description of the right
to appeal an adverse determination at the initial hearing.
Congress could provide an alternative solution by amending
The Uniform Relocation Assistance Act.' 3 An amended Act
could give tenants the right to challenge local police power condemnations on the merits, in addition to the already established
right to contest the amount of relocation benefits or the availability of comparable replacement housing." 4 Specifically, the
ninety-day notice period required for relocation benefits" 5 could
be extended to apply to mandatory notice and hearing rights
prior to any condemnation.

III.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

In the absence of state statutes or local ordinances providing
tenants with rights to notice and an opportunity for a hearing
before condemnation, tenants can claim a constitutional right to
procedural due process under the due process".. clauses of the
112.

See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.

113. 42 U.S.C.
ing notes 48-50.

§§
§

4601-02, 4604, 4621-38 (Supp. V 1987). See supra text accompany-

114.

49 C.F.R.

115.

See supra text accompanying note 50.

24.203 (1988) provides for relocation notice procedures.

116. Procedural due process cannot always be easily distinguished from substantive
due process. Some commentators maintain that review of state governmental practices
under procedural due process standards determines only whether the procedures are
basically fair. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 417 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter J. NOWAK]. This view, however, begs the question of what substantive interests warrant heightened judicial attention to the procedures employed to deprive someone of them.
Professor Tribe describes two ways that cases decided on grounds of procedural due
process embody substantive judgments. In the first, courts focus on the "intrinsic value
in the due process right to be heard" that "grants to the individuals or groups against
whom government decisions operate the chance to participate in the processes by which
those decisions are made, an opportunity to express their dignity as persons." In a second "more instrumental approach," courts look instead to the "means of assuring that
the society's agreed-upon rules of conduct, and its rules for distributing various benefits,
are in fact accurately and consistently followed. Rather than expressing the rule of law,
procedural due process in this sense implements law's rules-whatever they might be."
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666-67 (2d ed. 1988) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). In line with Tribe's analysis, Justice Marshall characterizes "the two
central concerns of procedural due process" as "the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process" and "the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations." Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)
(citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-62, 266-67 (1978)).
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federal Constitution" 7 and parallel provisions of state
constitutions. 8
The rights of notice and an opportunity to be heard are central to procedural due process" 9 under the fourteenth amendment. 2 ' To determine whether police power condemnations implicate those guarantees, however, a court must first establish
that a condemnation deprives a tenant of a protected interest. 2 '
If so, the court must then decide whether the protected interest
qualifies as a fundamental or core constitutional interest requiring procedural protection or whether a balancing test should be
used to weigh the protected interest in the tenancy against the
117. The fifth amendment requires that "[n]o person shall be...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST, amend. V. The fourteenth
amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
118. This Note analyzes tenants' rights to procedural due process under the federal
Constitution. But many state constitutions may also support claims to notice and a hearing. Most state constitutions have provisions parallel to federal due process language.
E.g., MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 17, ("No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law. The right of all individuals, firms, corporations and
voluntary associations to fair and just treatment in the course of legislative and executive
investigations and hearings shall not be infringed."). State courts commonly follow federal courts in interpreting the expanse and scope of state constitutional rights. E.g., Direct Plumbing Supply v. Dayton, 138 Ohio St. 540, 544-45 (1941) ("due course of law"
protection under the Ohio constitution has been held "equivalent" and to "run parallel"
to the fourteenth amendment) (citing OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16).
State courts may sometimes be even more flexible than federal courts in their interpretation of procedural due process rights. E.g., Stanton v. Tax Comm'n, 114 Ohio St. 658,
671, 151 N.E. 760, 764 (1926) (suggesting that the "due course of law" clause is "much
broader than the due process clause of the Fourteenth Federal Amendment"). Other
states also read state constitutional safeguards for affording due process to impose a
higher standard than under the federal constitution. E.g., Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169 (1978); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378
N.E.2d 78 (1978).
Justice Brennan has recently remarked upon what he called a "truly thrilling development," noting that "[miore and more state courts are construing state constitutional
counterparts of provisions of the federal Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their
states even more protection than the federal provisions, even though identically
phrased." Remarks, 36 RUTGERS L. REv. 725, 727 (1984).
119. The Supreme Court has stated that:
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due
Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
120. Under the Constitution, the fifth amendment limits federal power; the fourteenth amendment limits the power of the states. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law
§§ 804-821 (1979). Because proceedings to condemn occur under the police power of the
states rather than the federal government, the fourteenth amendment applies. However,
there is no great difference, in terms of the standards applied, between fifth and fourteenth amendment protection of procedural due process. Id. § 804.
121. See infra Part III-A.
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competing governmental interest in the police power to condemn.1 22 If the court deems the tenant's interest a core constitutional right or if the constitutional balance favors the tenant's
protected interest, the court must then determine what type of
12 3
hearing and notice are constitutionally required.
A.

Tenancies as a Protected Interest

To trigger procedural due process analysis under the fourteenth amendment, a state government or its authorized agent.2 4
must "deprive" a person of "life, liberty, or property.' ' 25 But
what constitutes constitutionally protected life, 26 liberty, or
property is not self-defining. Although a claim based on a "liberty" interest may be possible, 7 the strongest claim for tenants
is one asserting a cognizable "property" interest in their
tenancies.
1. Property interest- In a variety of circumstances, courts
recognize the interests of tenants as property interests. 28 Courts
often differ, however, as to whether a tenancy is "real" or "personal" property.12 9 Courts analyzing tenancies as a property interest under procedural due process have taken two approaches.
The currently prevalent view treats tenancies as a fundamental
property interest, warranting full procedural protection. A second, less accepted approach views tenancies as purely a creation
122. See infra Part III-B.
123. See infra Part III-C.
124. The fourteenth amendment applies "not only to the states as states, but also to
their agents." L. TRIaE, supra note 116, § 10-14, at 730 (emphasis in original) (citing Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1897)).
125. See supra note 117.
126. On the meaning of "life" (for the purposes of due process analysis), see J. NoWAK, supra note 116, at 531-33; Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 405, 410 n.37 (1977).
127. See infra Part III-A-2.
128. R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 14, § 6.11 (a tenant's property interest as "an estate
in land in the strictest sense").
129. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 107, takes a legal realist view of the cases, observing
that
[w]hether a leasehold should be treated as real or personal property continues to
be litigated in a variety of. . .contexts. Given the hybrid [historical] character
of the interest, it is not surprising to find the courts in considerable discord on
this issue. A consistent rationale for adopting either classification cannot be perceived in the cases. It appears that courts will either rely on the historical chattel characteristic of the lease [dating back to the end of the fifteenth century] or
ignore it, depending upon which view supports the desired result in a given
dispute.
Id. § 1.2, at 6.
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of state law. Under this approach, a state may narrowly circumscribe tenancy interests or, in some cases, eliminate them.
The Supreme Court has traditionally recognized that procedural due process requirements apply to common law property
interests, including tenancies.13 0 In Lindsey v. Normet,'3 ' for example, the Court assumed without question that periodic,
month-to-month tenancies constituted a property interest meriting fourteenth amendment protections. Recognizing this interest, the Court struck down as a violation of the equal protection
clause the requirement of a double bond to appeal an eviction
under a state forcible entry and wrongful detainer statute.'3 2
A somewhat more recent case also treats tenancies as fundamental property interests worthy of constitutional protection. In
Greene v. Lindsey,13 3 the Supreme Court held that public housing tenants faced with summary eviction proceedings possessed
a property interest sufficient for procedural due process requirements to apply. The Court recognized that the tenants "[had]
been deprived of a significant interest in property: indeed, of
the right to continued residence in their homes. '""
Together, Greene and Normet stand for the proposition that
tenancies remain constitutionally recognized property interests,
deserving procedural due process protections, including some
kind of notice and an opportunity for a hearing.13 5
Another approach taken by the Supreme Court considers
property interests protected by procedural due process as "not
created by the Constitution," but rather "created and their
dimensions. . . defined by existing rules or understandings that
",,""
As
stem from an independent source such as state law . .
Professor Simon restates this rule, "legislatures create property,
137
and courts protect it."
130. L. TRIBE, supra note 116, § 10-8, at 680.
131. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
132. Id. at 74-79. At the same time, the Court upheld a notice provision in the statute
that allowed only two to six days before a trial for eviction and a provision limiting the
issues raised to payment of rent. Id. at 64-74.
133. 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
134. Id. at 451 (emphasis added). The dissenting opinion in Greene did not dispute
that tenancies qualified as a protected interest. Id. at 456-60 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
135. For cases apparently giving the same fundamental protection to personal property, see N. Georgia Fishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (invalidating a prejudgment garnishment statute); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
136. Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
137. Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and
Perry, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 146, 146 (1983). Cf. Monaghan, supra note 126, at 435 (citation
omitted).
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In all types of tenancies, property rights and interests are created and defined through the operation of state statute and
common law.' 3 8 State law recognizes a tenant's right of possession, 139 an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, "0 a statutory or
implied warranty of habitability,"" notice requirements with
which a landlord must comply before terminating tenancies, 4 2
and other rights incident to a tenancy.1 4 3 On the surface, then, a
tenant's property interest seems to qualify clearly for the protection of procedural due process.
A recent trend in procedural due process cases, however, suggests that determining simply that a state creates the property
interest of tenants may not render that interest constitutionally
protected. For example, in Texaco, Inc. v. Short," the Supreme
Court upheld a state statute that terminated property interests
in coal, oil, gas, or other minerals left unused for twenty years,
without providing for individual notice to affected mineral owners. 45 Although recognizing that the state had "defined" a mineral estate as a "vested property interest,"' 4 the Court said that
"just as a State may create a property interest that is entitled to
constitutional protection, the State has the power to condition
the permanent retention of that property right on the performance of reasonable conditions that indicate a present intention
to retain the interest."'14 7 Short illustrates a trend in procedural
138.

The different kinds of tenancies recognized by state law are described in R. CUN§§ 6.14-.20; see also R. SCHOSHNSKI, supra note 107, §§ 2:1 to

NINGHAM, supra note 14,

2:26.
139. R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 14, §§ 6.21-.23.
140. Id. § 6.30; R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 107, §§ 3:3 to 3:9.
141. R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 14, §§ 6.39 (under state statutes), 6.38 (by state
court decisions); R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 107, §§ 3:16 to 3:29. See, e.g., Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); see also Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habitability in Residential
Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1979).
142. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 107, §§ 2:9 (tenancy for years), 2:13 to 2:14 (periodic
tenancy), 2:18 to 2:19 (tenancy at will), 2:21 to 2:22 (tenancy at sufferance), 2:26 (tenancy
created under void or unenforceable lease); 6:13 (notice under summary eviction
process).
143. Id. §§ 3:35 to 3:38 (rights created by repair and deduct statutes), 3:39 to 3:43
(rights under rent escrow statutes), 3:44 to 3:45 (rights under receivership statutes), 7:1
to 7:10 (rights under rent control) 12:1 to 12:13 (protections against retaliatory
evictions).
144. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
145. Id. -at 518-20. The case did not present the issue of a constitutionally sufficient
hearing, because filing a statement of claim within the statutory period completely foreclosed, without a hearing, divestment of the mineral interest. Id. at 519 (citations
omitted).
146. Id. at 525 (citation omitted).
147. Id. at 526 (emphasis added).
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due process cases indicating "a reluctance to look beyond state
law as a source of rights protected by due process guarantees."' 4 8
In Devines v. Maier,'4 9 the Seventh Circuit purported to apply
the analysis adopted in Short to deny a takings claim by tenants
who had been forced temporarily to vacate their homes through
enforcement of a municipal housing code. 150 Analogizing to the
statute upheld in Short, the court held that the state had "created a property right entitled to constitutional protection, (i.e., a
possessory interest in the leasehold) but conditions [sic] the retention of that right on a reasonable condition (i.e., inhabitability [sic] of the leasehold).''
Under this reasoning, the state can take away the property
interest in tenancies that it created. The state, by conditioning
the property interest of tenancies upon police power regulation
through building and housing codes, could avoid not only challenges for takings, but also any problems of procedural due process with respect to condemnations.
The logic of Devines is not persuasive, however. The court
misread the scope of Texaco v. Short, which involved exceptional circumstances. Short said only that a "[s]tate has the
power to condition the permanent retention of [a] property right
[created by the state] on the performance of reasonable conditions that indicate a present intention to, retain the interest."' 2 In contrast, the tenants in Devines strongly indicated an
intention to retain their property interest, some of them refusing
to comply with an order to vacate even under threat of
prosecution. 53
The factual circumstances of Devines also differ from Texaco
v. Short in another important respect. In Short, a mineral owner
could protect the mineral interest simply by filing a statement of
claim as provided under the statute. 5 4 But in Devines, the
tenants had no such alternative to protect their property inter148. L. TRIBE, supra note 116, § 10-10, at 695 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976)); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
149. 728 F.2d 876 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 836 (1984).
150. See supra note 29 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the takings
issue addressed in Devines.
151. Devines, 728 F.2d at 884. The court then argued that the housing code violations, upon which the order to vacate was based, resulted from "the inattention of the
landlord, as owner of the premises[,] and/or the inattention of the tenant, as owner of a
possessory interest in the premises." Id.
152. Short, 454 U.S. at 526 (emphasis added).
153. Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138, 144 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 728 F.2d 876, cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 836 (1984). The threat to prosecute "in some instances was carried out."
Id.
154. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 519 (1982) (citation omitted). See supra note 145.
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ests. Although the court in Devines recognized that the housing
code violations could have resulted from a landlord's negligence, 155 it perceived no unfairness in allowing the building inspector's retribution to fall on potentially innocent tenants. 15
The Seventh Circuit's misapplication in Devines of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Short points also to a more fundamental problem in procedural due process analysis. The constitutional rule that "legislatures create property, and courts
protect it"'1 57 has been gradually expanded in cases such as
Short to mean: Legislatures create property and condition the
circumstances of its retention; and courts protect the state's
power to do so in any way that it wants. The problem with this
approach lies in the circularity of looking to state law to see if it
creates a property interest, but then looking to state law again
to see what conditions it sets that can destroy that interest. Carried to its extreme, this framework of analysis effectively allows
states to deprive people of fundamental property interests, including their homes, in circumstances such as those illustrated
58
in Devines.1
Professor Tribe describes this problem in terms of the emerging "instrumental" approach to procedural due process. 159 He
traces the origin of this "positivist" perspective to Arnett v.
Kennedy.6 0 Announcing what has been dubbed the "bitter with
the sweet" doctrine,'
the Supreme Court said in Arnett that
"where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be
employed in determining that right, a litigant must take the bitter with the sweet." 6 ' At first, the Court applied the doctrine to
155. See supra note 151.
156. Recognizing this unfairness, the initial Seventh Circuit decision in Devines remarked that the city e'had various options available to it. It might, for example, have
sought to enforce its orders to repair directly against the owners of substandard structures." Choosing instead to evict tenants through the power to vacate, the city "placed a
disproportionately heavy burden on those individual members of the community who
have little or no choice but to live in low cost, often substandard, housing." Devines v.
Maier, 665 F.2d 138, 146 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 728 F.2d 876, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 836
(1984).
157. See supra note 137.
158. As Justice Brennan has observed, giving the states "'unfettered discretion' in
defining 'property' for purposes of the Due Process Clause" effectively allows the states
to "avoid all due process safeguards attendant upon the loss even of the necessities of
life, merely by labelling them as not constituting 'property.'" Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341, 353 n.4 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
159. See supra note 116.
160. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
161. See L. TRIBE, supra note 116, § 10-12, at 707-08.
162. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 153-54.
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cut back the scope of the Goldberg v. Kelly 63 line of entitlement
cases. 6 4 More recently, in cases like Texaco v. Short, the same
"instrumental" framework threatens to shrink protection of interests that had been traditionally considered fundamental or
"core" constitutional interests.1 65
Professor Tribe maintains, however, that this approach does
not "portend a significant cutback in all of the 'core' interests
protected by due process." '66 With respect to at least some core
interests, presumably including the property interest of tenants,
a majority of the Court probably still agrees with Justice White
that "[w]hile the State may define what is and what is not property, once having defined those rights the Constitution defines
due process. 1817 A majority of the Court explicitly adopted this
approach in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill.1 8
Holding that procedural due process required a pre-discharge
hearing under a state statute allowing public employment firings
only for cause, Justice White's majority opinion found the "bitter with the sweet" approach of Arnett v. Kennedy "clearly rejected." '
On this view, legislatures cannot define away the
property interest in tenancies, which have roots in the common
1 70
law as well as in state statutes.
2. Liberty interest- Although a tenant's interest in police
power condemnations qualifies as a protected property interest,
it may also implicate "liberty." The Supreme Court noted in
163. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
164. See L. TRIBE, supra note 116, § 10-10. Goldberg recognized a limited right to
property in expected government benefits or what has been christened the "new property." See generally, Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Van Alstyne,
Cracks in the "New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977). For an account of the impact and contemporary significance of Goldberg, see Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding
Individual Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1, 146-50 (1984).
165. L. TRIBE, supra note 116, § 10-11 (discussing primarily Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976)).
166. Id. § 10-11, at 704.
167. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 185 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
169. Id. at 541 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982)). The Court also stated that:
[T]he Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights-life, liberty,
and property-cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate
procedures. The categories of substance and procedure are distinct. Were the
rule otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology. "Property"
cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation . . . .The right
to due process "is conferred , not by legislative grace, but by constitutional
guarantee."
Id. at 541 (quoting Arnett (Powell, J., concurring in part)).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 138-43.
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Board of Regents v. Roth 171 that "[i]n a Constitution for a free
people, there can be2 no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty' must
17
be broad indeed.'
Courts could construe broad language appearing in some
precedents to recognize a liberty interest for tenants. For example, in Meyer v. Nebraska,75 the Supreme Court stated that:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received
much consideration and some of the included things have
been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happi74
ness by free men.'
Cases like Meyer could be read to apply to tenants needing a
place to live and a home for themselves and their children. Conceivably, the argument could even be advanced that the liberty
interest requires government to provide some sort of shelter or
home to its citizens, whether in the form of tenancies or otherwise. But the argument that tenancies are "property" interests
protected under the constitution is more plausible and more
75
substantially supported by precedent.
B. Balancing the Protected Interest of the Tenancy Against
the Governmental Interest in Police Power Condemnation
After identifying a tenancy as a protected interest, a court
must then make a choice as to whether (1) the interest constitutes a constitutional core interest significant enough to require
some kind of notice and hearing prior to deprivation without
further discussion or (2) the protected interest should be bal171. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
172. Id. at 572 (citations omitted).
173. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Meyer struck down a state statute making the teaching of
the German language a crime as an infringement of the liberty interest protected under
procedural due process.
174. Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
175. See supra Part 11-A-1.
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anced against the governmental interest in police power
condemnation.
This analytical decision is usually made implicitly in procedural due process cases. The outcome may depend on whether
the court
characterizes the interest as tapping a constitutional
"core ' ' 76 or as deriving solely from state law. 177 When a core interest is involved, a court may assume that the Constitution requires a prior hearing and notice, asking only the procedural
question of what form these guarantees must take. Greene v.
Lindsey 178 and Lindsey v. Normet 1 79 take this approach with respect to tenancies. 80 On the other hand, a court may find that
the balancing test announced in Mathews v. Eldridge'' must
precede a decision on the form of constitutional guarantees. In
addition, a court may find that exceptions under circumstances
of "emergency''182 or "indirect adverse effects' 8 s waive procedural due process requirements.
1. The Eldridge test- The Supreme Court set forth a balancing test, purporting to apply to all procedural due process
questions, in Mathews v. Eldridge. The Court held that procedural due process determinations entailed balancing "the governmental and private interests that are affected.' 8 4 The Court
proceeded to erect a cost-benefit framework for reviewing procedural due process decisions, declaring that the following factors
must be balanced: (1) "the private interest that will be affected
by the official action," (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,"
and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.""1 5
In Eldridge, the Court applied this balancing approach to the
question of whether procedural due process required evidentiary
pre-termination hearings before cutting off Social Security disability benefits. In holding that such hearings were not constitu176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See supra text accompanying notes 130-35, 165-70.
See supra text accompanying notes 136-51.
456 U.S. 444 (1982).
405 U.S. 56 (1972).
See supra text accompanying notes 131-35.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
See infra Part III-B-2.
See infra Part III-B-3.
424 U.S. at 334 (citations omitted).
Id. at 335.
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tionally required, the Court distinguished Goldberg v. Kelly,"8 6
which had required evidentiary hearings prior to certain welfare
payment terminations. 7 The Supreme Court concluded that a
less formal procedure allowing full evidentiary hearing only after
termination of disability benefits satisfied procedural due process standards. 8 8 Eldridge, now the established test in the administrative benefits context,'8 9 undercuts the reach and continuing vitality of Goldberg.
Initially, Eldridge seemed limited to administrative benefits
or "new property" cases.'9 0 But Justice Powell's opinion foreshadowed a wider application outside of the government benefits
context. 19' Preceding the announcement of its new balancing
test, the Court in Eldridge walked through some of the major
procedural due process cases, many of which concerned mainstream "liberty" or "old property" rights having nothing to do
with expectations of government benefits.'
Such a treatment
suggests that Eldridge balancing may have been meant, by at
least some of the Justices, to apply to all procedural due process
186.

397 U.S. 254 (1970).

187.

See supra note 164.

188. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976). For a persuasive argument that
the balancing test adopted by Eldridge is one of "intuitive functionalism" failing to provide a statement of values for procedural due process to protect, see Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
See also L. TRIBE, supra note 116, § 10-13. For a broader critique of balancing as a
method of constitutional adjudication, see Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
189. See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (applying the Eldridge test in finding no procedural right to a lawyer in veterans' benefits
qualification hearings); Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115 (1985) (upholding "mass" notice
of food stamp reductions by legislative act against procedural due process challenge).
190. With respect to government housing benefits, tenants have for the most part
fared well even under the Eldridge balancing test. Lower-income tenants receiving federal housing assistance have been held to have a protected property interest in their
continued expectation of receiving benefits, requiring a hearing before termination of
their tenancies "for cause." See, e.g., Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1342,
1345-48 (4th Cir. 1982); Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 925
(11th Cir. 1982) ("Section 8 tenants have constitutionally protected property rights in an
expectation of continued occupancy and receipt of rent and utility subsidies."). See generally Note, Procedural Due Process in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 880 (1973).
191.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332-35.

192. Id. (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)).
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cases. To date, the Court has not limited the scope of application of the Eldridge balancing test.193
Eldridge, however, must have some limits with respect to core
constitutional interests. For example, Eldridge balancing presumably would not allow the substitution of a highly accurate lie
detector for civil trials simply because the instrument rendered
"erroneous deprivations" all but impossible. Other rights, including the right to be secure in one's home, should also be considered core rights worth the full constitutional protection of
procedural due process-without balancing.""
2. The emergency exception- In certain extreme circumstances, established precedent favors the police power to condemn without according any procedural protections. This occurs
in emergencies such as those brought about by natural disasters
calling for immediate governmental response. 95
The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed this "emergency exception" to procedural due process guarantees in the
context of the regulation of buildings.' 9 6 But lower courts have
found that emergencies caused by fire, flooding, or epidemic,
which pose an immediate threat to public health and safety, per193. See, e.g., Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 618-19 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that the Eldridge "three factor standard" applies to "all due-process questions" in the context of discussing requirements for written explanations for probation
revocations); Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112, 1116-18 (1983) (per curiam) (applying
the Eldridge test to the context of state procedures for suspension of drivers' licenses for
drunk driving); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473-76 (1983) (applying the Eldridge
analysis in rejecting a due process challenge to state prison "administrative segregation"
procedures).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 130-35, 165-70.
195. E.g., Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698 (1897):
That a State, in a bona fide exercise of its police power, may interfere with private property, and even order its destruction, is as well settled as any legislative
power can be, which has for its objects the welfare and comfort of the citizen.
For instance, meats, fruits and vegetables do not cease to become private property by their decay; but it is clearly within the power of the State to order their
destruction in times of epidemic, or whenever they are so exposed as to be deleterious to the,public health. There is also property in rags and clothing; but that
does not stand in the way of their destruction in case they become infected and
dangerous to the public health. No property is more sacred than one's home,
and yet a house may be pulled down or blown up by the public authorities,if
necessary to avert or stay a general conflagration, and that, too, without recourse against such authorities for the trespass.
Id. at 704-05 (emphasis added).
196. Cases applying the emergency exception in other contexts include Mackey v.
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1979) (allowing immediate suspension of drivers' licenses
following refusals to take breathalyzer tests); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339
U.S. 594 (1950) (upholding seizures of misbranded drugs before adversary hearing);
North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1908) (approving destruction of poultry "unfit for human consumption" as an "emergency").
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mit immediate police power condemnation of buildings." 7 Conditions in a building causing imminent threat of fire or structural collapse also pose emergency situations authorizing
summary police power condemnation for the protection of a
building's tenants and occupants, as well as neighbors and
passersby. 198
3. The "indirect adverse effects" exception- In O'Bannon
v. Town Court Nursing Center, 99 the Supreme Court carved out
what may be called an "indirect adverse effects" exception to
the general rule of procedural due process requirements. In
Town Court, the Court found elderly nursing home residents receiving Medicare or Medicaid not entitled to procedural due
process protections when a federal agency revoked their nursing
home's certification and thus indirectly cut off their government
benefits, forcing them to find another nursing home or alternative place to live. In upholding the decertification, the Supreme
Court revived an old principle that "the due process provision of
the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the indirect adverse effects of governmental action."2 00 Applying this indirect adverse
effects principle, the Court held that the decertification under
"valid regulations did not directly affect the patients' legal
rights or deprive them of any constitutionally protected interest
in life, liberty or property."20 1
The reasoning of Town Court should not justify depriving
tenants of procedural due process because receipt of government
benefits is easily distinguishable from the private property interest of a tenancy. In addition, the condemnation of one's building
is a direct, not an indirect, deprivation of the protected interest
that is one's home. In Town Court, the elderly patients could
transfer to another certified facility, thus retaining their benefits. 2 No possibility of retention exists in the case of a condemned tenancy. Although tenants may look elsewhere for hous197. Sources collecting cases on this score include 7 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 19,
§ 24.561, at 545-46; 16 AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 588 (1979); Annotation, supra
note 22, at 78-82.
198. Annotation, supra note 22, at 78-82.
199. 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
200. Id. at 789 (emphasis added) (citing The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
457, 551 (1871) and Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (upholding state immunity statute barring tort liability of a parole board that had released an inmate who
subsequently tortured and murdered a fifteen-year-old girl)).
201. Id. at 790.
202. See Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 80-82 (3d Cir. 1984), for a case similar on its
facts to and following Town Court, but intimating a different result in situations involving nontransferable government benefits or the unavailability of another facility for the
patients.
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ing, the interest in the condemned tenancy is completely
destroyed.
4. Application of the Eldridge test- In the absence of an
emergency or other exception that permits circumvention of procedural due process, a court may decide to apply a form of the
Eldridge balancing test 0 to determine whether due process for
tenants is required in police power condemnation proceedings.
The first Eldridge factor, "the private interest," is substantial
in the case of tenants facing condemnation of their building.
Their interest is "keeping a roof over their heads."2 "
The second Eldridge factor, "the risk of erroneous deprivation" under existing condemnation procedures, is more difficult
to calculate. If the owner of a building vigorously and in good
faith contests the condemnation, the risk of erroneous condemnation seems quite low. But when an owner prefers condemnation as a means to increase profits or colludes with the condemning agency,2 0 5 the risk of erroneous deprivation may be quite
high.20 ' In any event, the tenant's substantial interest probably
outweighs even a minimal risk of erroneous deprivation.
On the other hand, the third Eldridge factor, "the Government's interest" in police power condemnations, is also substantial. State and municipal power to abate nuisances, to enforce
housing and sanitation codes, and to eliminate "urban blight" is
necessary to protect the public health and safety, and to remedy
problems of urban housing degeneration.0 7
In the final analysis, the appropriateness of procedural due
process requirements in police power condemnations may turn,
under an Eldridge analysis, on how to balance the purposes and
203. See supra Part III-B-1.
204. As Justice Blackmun has noted,
It is well recognized that the Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution grew out of the "law of the land" provision of Magna Carta and its later
manifestations in English statutory law. That the home was at the center of
those property interests historically sought to be protected by due process is
underscored by the fact that the phrase "due process of law" first appeared in
the following codification: "No man of what state or condition he be, shall be put
out of his lands or tenements nor taken, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without he be brought to answer by due process of law."
O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 792 n.2 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (quoting 28 Edw. III, ch. 3 (1354)).
For a more expansive treatment of this factor, see Scherer, Gideon's Shelter: The
Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings,
23 Harv. C.L.-C.R. L. Rev. 557, 562 (1988). Scherer seems to concede too quickly, however, that the Eldridge test must apply.
205. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
206. See Scherer, supra note 204, at 573.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 19-27.
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severity of a specific kind of police power enforcement against a
tenant's right to a home. The difficulty of comparing these two
general interests of the state and the tenant favors a presumption of tenants' procedural rights to notice and the opportunity
for a hearing. This presumption might be made rebuttable by a
showing of an extraordinary governmental interest, such as an
imminent threat to public health or safety implicating the emergency exception. Courts should not, however, find routine condemnations, such as those in the interest of the enforcement of
housing codes or "urban renewal," to fit this exceptional category. Courts should therefore ordinarily view the tenant's interest in a home as outweighing any governmental inconvenience or
expense that procedural protection may cause.
C.

More Balancing: The Type of Hearing and Kind of
Notice Required

Justice Powell has observed that in procedural due process
cases "the Court has spoken sparingly about the requisite procedures. ' 20 8 He recalls the "truism" that procedural due process,
"unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," ' 9 but
is "flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." ' The type of hearing and notice required varies from one setting to another.
1. Type of hearing- As a general rule, "some kind of hearing is required at some time" before a government or its agent
can constitutionally deprive a person of a protected property or
liberty interest.2 11 Judge Friendly outlines several elements characteristic of a hearing in accordance with procedural due process
requirements: (1) an unbiased tribunal; (2) notice of the proposed action and the ground for it; (3) an opportunity to present
reasons why the proposed action should not be taken; (4) the
right to call witnesses, to know the evidence against one, and to
208. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969)).
209. Id. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
210. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
211. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (holding,
among other things, that procedural due process requirements applied to prison disciplinary measures, including decisions to impose solitary confinement and to revoke "goodtime credit" for satisfactory behavior)).
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have a decision based only on the evidence presented; (5) the
right to counsel; (6) the making of a record and a statement of
reasons for the decision; (7) public attendance; and (8) judicial
review.. '
One way to accommodate procedural due process requirements in a police power condemnation would require a judicial
determination on the merits of the condemnation, perhaps most
appropriately in specialized housing courts.21 3 At minimum,
some administrative agency should hold a hearing.
Normal or routine condemnations, then, present a relatively
easy case. Tenants should receive the same opportunity for a
hearing that owners receive in the jurisdiction,2 1 usually in a
judicial or quasi-judicial forum with evidentiary procedures and
the opportunity to have a lawyer present. 15 In some states and
municipalities, an administrative agency may qualify to stand in
as a "neutral" arbiter.
Procedural due process usually requires that a hearing occur
before the deprivation of the protected interest takes place.21 '
An exception to the rule requiring a pre-termination hearing occurs only when "some valid governmental interest is at stake
that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event."21 '
Whether a governmental interest in a condemnation is substantial enough to permit a post-deprivation hearing depends
again on Eldridge balancing. In Eldridge, the Supreme Court
212. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-1304 (1957);
accord J. NOWAK, supra note 116, at 555-56.
213. New York City has established perhaps the most powerful specialized housing
court, a "housing part" created within the New York City civil court system. N.Y. CITY
CIv. CT. ACT § 110 (McKinney Supp. 1989). For discussion of this court, see Rutzick &
Huffman, supra note 24. Other cities with specialized housing courts, though with more
limited roles, include Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, New Orleans, Philadelphia,
Pittsburgh, and St. Louis. Id. at 740-41 (citations omitted). For a critique of Detroit's
housing court experiment, see Mosier & Soble, Modern Legislation, Metropolitan Court,
Miniscule Results: A Study of Detroit's Landlord-Tenant Court, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 8
(1973).
214. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
215. The argument has been advanced that procedural due process should also require a right to appointed counsel on behalf of indigent tenants. See Scherer, supra note
204.
216. As the Supreme Court stated in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971): "it is fundamental that except in emergency situations (and this is not one) due process requires
that when a State seeks to terminate [a protected] interest . . . .it must afford 'notice
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before the termination
becomes effective." Id. at 542 (emphasis in original). For other cases holding that procedural due process requires a hearing before deprivation, see L. TRIBE, supra note 116,
§ 10-14, at 719 n.6.
217. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (quoted in L. TRIBE, supra note
116, § 10-14, at 719).
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found a post-deprivation hearing sufficient for cutting off Social
Security benefits.21 8 In other recent cases, the Court has allowed
post-deprivation hearings under certain extenuating circumstances. 21 9 These cases can be easily distinguished from the setting of police power condemnations of buildings. Some cases refer to special environments, such as the regulation of minors in
public schools. 2 ' Others involve circumstances that make a predeprivation hearing virtually impossible.221
Cases like Mackay v. Montrym,12 2 upholding revocation of a
driver's license without a prior hearing for refusal to submit to a
breathalyzer test, fall under the emergency exception to full procedural due process protections.2 23 Because some state statutes
may describe an "emergency" in terms of "slum," "ghetto," or
"blighted" housing, 22" a court could possibly find a "statutory
emergency" and dispense with the requirement for a pre-deprivation hearing.
But such an approach would ignore the important interests
and expectations of tenants. A poor tenant may prefer to put up
with substandard housing in a slum or a ghetto to living on the
street, moving into more crowded conditions with relatives or
friends, or finding another place to live. Absent immediate danger to public health or safety, the importance of the tenant's interest in a home should outweigh supposed statutory emergencies. As then Justice Rehnquist noted, cases falling under the
emergency exception allowing post-deprivation hearings recognize "the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any meaningful predeprivation process. "225
He then observed that "[o]ur past cases mandate that some kind
218. See supra text accompanying note 188-90.
219. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 116, § 10-14 (citing cases).
220. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (permitting corporal punishment without a prior hearing); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 567 (1975) (requiring a hearing for a
temporary suspension from school "either prior to suspension or within a reasonable
time thereafter").
221. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (no hearing before tortious destruction of
personal property during prison cell search); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (no
hearing before tortious loss of hobby materials by prison officials). See L. TRIBE, supra
note 116, § 10-14, at 726-28.
222. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
223. See supra Part III-B-2. See also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979) (revocation
of horse trainers license permitted without prior hearing when post-race urinalysis
showed horse had been drugged).
224. Such language is commonly used in urban renewal legislation. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 18.55.950 (3), (18) (1986).
225. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981).
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of hearing is required at some time before a State finally deprives a person of his property interest."2 2' 6
In a police power condemnation, a pre-deprivation hearing is
necessary because the condemnation itself deprives the tenants
of their property interest. In addition, only a pre-deprivation
hearing provides tenants with remedies such as enforcement orders to repair or otherwise preserve the tenancies.2 2 7 Where deprivations are "truly irreversible," the "right to notice and a hearing . . . [must] be granted at a time when the deprivation can
still be prevented."2 2 8 Exceptions to the procedural due process
requirement of a pre-deprivation hearing in the context of police
power condemnations of buildings should therefore apply only
when a real, specific and immediately dangerous emergency
occurs.
2. Form and timing of notice- The Supreme Court has recognized that a hearing "has little reality or worth unless one is
informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself
whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."2'29 As this
language suggests, notice is also a vital element of procedural
due process. Because notice ordinarily accompanies a hearing,
tenants faced with police power condemnations should claim
some opportunity for a hearing to make out a related claim for
notice.2 30
Procedural due process requires that notice of a hearing be
given in writing. 231 The notice should also be written in a language that a recipient can reasonably be expected to understand.23 2 In addition, the notice must state "the charges or basis
for government action. 23 3s Notice of a police power condemna226. Id. at 540.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10, 32.
228. L. TRIBE, supra note 116, § 10-14, at 719 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 81-82 (1972)).
229. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
230. For an argument that notice may be procedurally required even in the absence
of a prior hearing, see DiMassimo v. City of Clearwater, 805 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1986)
(requiring notice, but not a hearing, to tenants before termination of public utilities at a
landlord's request).
231. Friendly, supra note 212, at 1280 & n.76. After remarking "that notice [must] be
given and that it be timely and clearly inform the individual of the proposed action and
the grounds for it," Judge Friendly notes that "[slubsidiary questions are whether the
notice must be written and how long prior to the hearing it must be given." Id. Oral
notice may sometimes be constitutionally sufficient. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975) (finding either written or oral notice to be sufficient, at the discretion of the administrative official, in cases of hearings for suspension from school).
232. See Note, El Derecho de Aviso: Due Process and Bilingual Notice, 83 YALE L.J.
385 (1973).
233. J. NOWAK, supra note 116, at 555.
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tion must therefore set forth the grounds for the condemnation.
Failing to give adequate notice of grounds for condemnation
would deprive tenants of their vital interest in "an opportunity
to present reasons why the proposed action should not be
taken." '3 4 Finally, the notice should describe what will occur at
the hearing.3 5
Several Supreme Court cases are instructive as to the form of
the notice required. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 3 ' the Court affirmed that the notice "must be of such
nature as reasonably to convey the required information," affording a "reasonable time for those interested to make their
appearance."2 37
Two later Supreme Court cases involving eminent domain
condemnations followed Mullane. Both Walker v. City of
Hutchinson2 3 and Schroeder v. City of New York 2" 9 held notice
of eminent domain proceedings by publication in local newspapers, even if supplemented by the posting of notices along the
property affected, constitutionally insufficient. Both cases considered use of the mail, a reliable and reasonable alternative,
constitutionally required.2 4 0
234. Friendly, supra note 212, at 1281.
235. See L. TRIBE, supra note 116, § 10-15, at 732 n.6 (notice "must include not only
information that a hearing is about to occur but information about what the hearing will
entail-including both 'the nature of the charges [and] also . . .the substance of the
relevant supporting evidence' ") (quoting Brock v. Roadway Express, 481 U.S. 252
(1987)) (emphasis in original).

236. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
237. Id. at 314 (citations omitted). Mullane held unconstitutional a statute allowing
notice by publication of adjudication affecting financial interests in a common trust
fund, when the names and addresses of the holders of these interests were known, making notice by mail easily possible. Justice Jackson's majority opinion in Mullane argued
that "when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process.
The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Id. at 315. He found notice by publication
"inadequate" compared to notice by mail
not because in fact it fails to reach everyone, but because under the circumstances it is not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand. However it may have been in former times, the
mails today are recognized as an efficient and inexpensive means of
communication.
Id. at 319.

238. 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
239. 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
240. Walker involved the condemnation of part of an owner's property for the purpose of widening a city's streets. Finding notice by publication to be constitutionally
insufficient, the Court reasoned:
In Mullane we pointed out many of the infirmities of such notice and emphasized the advantage of some kind of personal notice to interested parties. In the
present case there seem to be no compelling or even persuasive reasons why such
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Greene v. Lindsey,24 ' also following Mullane, held that in forcible entry and detainer actions, notice given solely by posting a
copy on the tenant's door, even after a personal service attempt
had failed, did not satisfy procedural due process. The Court
again virtually required notice by mail as a constitutional
'
minimum. 42
Finally, Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 4'3 following
Mullane and Greene, extended the same rationale to notice of a
tax sale of real property to a mortgagee, holding notice by publication and by posting in a county courthouse constitutionally insufficient."" Mennonite concluded with an even broader holding
than Mullane or Greene: "Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or
property interests of any party, whether unlettered or well
versed in commercial practice, if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable." 45
In the situation of tenants faced with police power condemnations, notice by mail as well as direct posting appears constitutionally required unless personal service is accomplished. Condemning officials, who may have difficulty ascertaining tenants'
direct notice cannot be given. Appellant's name was known to the city and was
on the official records. Even a letter would have apprised him that his property
was about to be taken and that he must appear if he wanted to be heard...
352 U.S. at 116 (footnote omitted).
Similarly, Schroeder concerned the condemnation of a house and accompanying land,
used by the owner and her family as a summer home, for the purpose of constructing a
public aqueduct. Applying Mullane and Walker, the Court found the posting of hand
bills along the route of the proposed aqueduct and notice placed in the city record, as
well as notice by publication, to be insufficient notice under the fourteenth amendment.
Use of the mail was constitutionally preferred. 371 U.S. at 212-13.
241. 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
242. The Court concluded that:
[N]otice by mail in the circumstances of this case would go a long way toward
providing the constitutionally required assurance that the State has not allowed
its power to be invoked against a person who has had no opportunity to present
a defense despite a continuing interest in the resolution of the controversy. Particularly where the subject matter of the action also happens to be the mailing
address of the defendant, and where personal service is ineffectual, notice by
mail may reasonably be relied upon to provide interested persons with actual
notice of judicial proceedings.
Id. at 455 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
243. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
244. Justice Marshall's opinion argued that because the "mortgagee's address could
have been ascertained by reasonably diligent efforts" or reliance could have been placed
on "the well-known skill of postal officials and [employees] in making proper delivery of
letters defectively addressed," then "[s]imply mailing a letter...quite likely would have
provided actual notice." Id. at 798 n.4 (citation omitted).
245. Id. at 800 (emphasis in original).
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names, at least know the address of the building. They therefore
could fulfill the form of notice requirement by mailing letters to
"Residents" or "Occupants" addressed to the subject building,
as well as by posting notice on the tenants' doors.
As for the time period required for the notice, case law suggests only that notice must grant a "reasonable time" to prepare
for the hearing.24 In gauging the necessary time period between
giving notice and the hearing itself, courts "look to the realities
of the case" involved.24 7
In determining reasonable tenant notice in police power condemnations, courts should consider traditional standards applied when tenants are removed. Federal law requires notice of
any action taken pursuant to a federally-funded program that
may displace a person a full ninety days before the actioa is
scheduled to take place.2" 8 Where it applies, this federal requirement takes care of the timing problem. In the absence of this
requirement, analogy to state statutes and common law requirements for giving notice to end a tenancy may be appropriate.24
It seems reasonable to suggest that the same period of time required for a private landlord to end a particular tenancy under
state law should apply when the state seeks to end the tenancy
through police power condemnation, unless an emergency justifies a shorter time.2 50 Another solution to the timing problem
would give tenants the same time for notice of the hearing as
that given to owners under almost all state statutes. 5 1
CONCLUSION

This Note has shown that a majority of states do not provide
tenants of buildings the same procedural protections in police
power condemnations as provided to owners and landlords. Even
states with some built-in statutory protections often leave loop246. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950) (citing Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900)).
247. Greene, 456 U.S. at 451 (citing North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S.
276 (1925)).
248. 49 C.F.R. § 24.203 (1988). The regulation also requires follow-up notice 30 days
before removal. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
249. See supra text accompanying note 142.
250. However, because Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), upheld the constitutionality of a forcible entry and wrongful detainer statute allowing only four to six days
notice before a hearing, id. at 64-67, courts may not find more than several days notice
constitutionally required. See supra note 132.
251. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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holes that enable municipalities or other authorized agencies to
ignore these protections. In particular, home rule provisions can
allow the enactment of ordinances regulating police power condemnations that lack procedural protections.
This Note proposes that tenants receive the same procedural
protections given to owners when threatened with police power
condemnation. They should participate at the earliest stages in
hearings aimed at determining the appropriateness of demolition or evacuation. State legislatures therefore should give tenancies full protection in these situations. In the absence of protections from statutes or ordinances, courts should recognize the
tenants' interests as constitutionally protected, requiring notice
and opportunity for a hearing under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.

